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In 1991 the University of Delaware-Bulgaria Coalition, with the sup-
port of the United States Agency for International Development, began a
program of economics education for Bulgarians. A difficulty in teaching
courses in money and banking at that time was the absence of summary
materials that captured the specific detail of the Bulgarian economic sys-
tem. The first edition of this monograph sought to fill that gap.
The intended audience was students of money and banking, who
might use the book as a supplement to western textbooks on the subject.
No attempt was made to explain standard concepts in money and bank-
ing, but rather to place the Bulgarian situation within the standard con-
text and vocabulary.
Research for this project began in the autumn of 1992 as a class exer-
cise for the Advanced Economics Program. The final class assignment for
students in the money and banking course was to investigate a specific as-
pect of the Bulgarian banking system. The original monograph was an in-
tegration and embellishment of the papers that resulted from their re-
search. The program participants who contributed to the manuscript were
Svetlana Alexandrova, Anna Andonova, Kamen Antanassov, Tzvetan
Bonev, Georgi Chalakov, Stoyan Iliev, Roumiana Ilieva, Jordon N.
Jordanov, Jordan V. Jordanov, Dimitar Kanev, Hristo Mavrov, Antassia
Miteva, Anton Pashov, Nedailka Petkova, Lambrin Shpatov, Valentin
Vulov, and Plamen Yossifov. The monograph was published in 1993 by
the Bulgarian National Bank.
As the Bulgarian banking system continued to change, the second edi-
tion was published in early 1996. It included a more complete description
of the activities of the Bulgarian National Bank and a discussion of the
Law on the Settlement of Nonperforming Credits which had been passed
in the interim period.
After writing the second edition, it had been our intention to write a
third edition within the next two years. This would have meant rewriting
the monograph during 1996 and 1997. This was the middle of the financial
crisis. Events overtook us. We decided that the system was changing so
quickly that anything we wrote at that time would be out-of-date before
the ink was dry.
In this third revised edition we chronicle the changes that took place
during and following the crisis in 1996 and 1997. This edition has been ex-
tensively revised to reflect these changes. The sections on the Bulgarian Na-
tional Bank and the money supply have been extensively revised to reflect
the changes brought about by the establishment of the currency board. New
sections have been added on nonbank financial institutions and the currency
board. (The section on the Law on the Settlement of Nonperforming Cred-
its has been dropped.) In the conclusion we have added a discussion of the









1 A project of this size could not be successfully completed without the
help of many people. Over the years the leadership and staff of the Bulgar-
ian National Bank have provided much needed encouragement and sup-
port. Publication of the early editions would not have been possible with-
out Lubomir Christov, formerly Chief Economist, who provided much en-
couragement and reviewed the entire monographs. Former Deputy Gover-
nor Mileti Mladenov, also provided wonderful support during these early
years.
The present leadership and staff of the Bulgarian National Bank have
also provided great encouragement. We would especially like to thank
Roumen Avramov, who read and commented on the entire manuscript,
and Martin Zaimov, whose support made the project possible. Members
of the research staff Nickolay Nenovsky, Kalin Hristov and Boris Petrov
also reviewed the manuscript and gave generously of their time and exper-
tise to help us. Darina Koleva was very helpful with technical support and
assistance.
Special thanks are due to Virginia Miller and Andrew Kenningham
who assisted with the production and provided comments on the first edi-
tion. Stan Shumway has provided much needed encouragement through-
out the many editions of the monograph. Lew Staples and Tzvetan
Mantchev provided helpful comments on the most recent manuscript.
Sonia Baleva helped us with data processing and technical formatting of the
text .
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
through their grant to the University of Delaware has provided financial
support for all three editions. Most recently this support came through
FLAG International LLC, under a management contract with the Univer-
sity of Delaware, a USAID-funded private sector strengthening project in
Bulgaria. The second edition would not have been possible without a
ëTwinning Grantí from the National Research Council (U.S.A.). The
project has also benefited from support from the Bulgarian National Bank
which has covered translation and publishing costs for each of the three
editions.
As can be seen, this monograph owes much to many. The remaining
errors, however, are the sole responsibility of the authors.
I. Monetizing the Bulgarian Economy
If capital is at the heart of capitalism, then well-functioning capital mar-
kets are at the heart of a well-functioning capitalist economy.
1
 Joseph Stiglitz
While all economies must organize production and distribute the out-
put of production among members of society, the institutions which pro-
1
 Stiglitz (1992), p. 161.  This chapter draws heavily on Stiglitzís description of the insti-












duce and distribute goods and services are very different in centrally-
planned economies (CPEs) and capitalist economies. As Bulgaria has
transitioned from a CPE to a capitalist economy, many financial arrange-
ments have been dramatically altered.
One essential difference between the two systems is the importance of
money in capitalist economies. In a capitalist economy money buys goods.
When money buys goods, resources are directed towards those economic
agentsóenterprises or consumersówho have money. This contrasts sharply
with the situation in a CPE where the role of money is much more limited.
Inputs to enterprise production are determined not by the money that the
enterprise has, but rather by central planners. Even in the area of retail
sales where money is more commonly used in a CPE, money is less impor-
tant than it is in a capitalist economy. Who obtains goods and services is
often determined by non-monetary criteria. In a CPE having money does
not necessarily mean that an individual can purchase a good.
Prices were released, or freed, in Bulgaria in February 1991. Suddenly
money bought goods. The economy was ìmonetized,î although not with-
out creating serious stress as the new role of money was superimposed on
old practices. Two transition problems are of special importance. The first
has its roots in the different incentives for household saving and consump-
tion that arose when the economy was monetized. Because money had not
been particularly useful for purchasing goods in the CPE, many people
had saved large sums. When goods could finally be purchased with money,
this ìmonetary overhangî created a large demand for the existing supply
of goods. A sharp increase in prices ensued. This along with an inability to
control increases in the money supply generated an inflation that was not
really brought under control until a currency board was established in
1997. The second problem is in the production sector. Under central plan-
ning financial statements, framed in monetary units, were used to account
for firm inputs and outputs. Useful as these financial statements might
have been for the central planners, they did not play a direct role in allo-
cating resources to firms since money could not be used to purchase
goods. If enterprises needed additional credits to account for the goods al-
located to them under the plan, the credit was advanced. The difficulty
was that this old governmental practice of providing additional credits per-
sisted long after the production sector became monetized. When money
was advanced to enterprises in the form of loans, it was used to purchase
inputs or pay wages so that scarce resources are being allocated in the pro-
cess. However, the money was often advanced without doing careful
evaluations of the credit worthiness of the enterprises. As a result financial
resources were not being directed towards the most productive activities.
Valuable resources were wasted.
In part there were important political reasons why the state banks









1 failed because of lack of credit, this would cause serious economic disrup-
tion, and there would be political problems. Eventually, too many re-
sources were wasted and the economy could not be brought under control.
In 1996 and 1997 there was a financial crisis and the economic disruption
led to demonstrations in January 1997. The Videnov government fell, and
there were new elections in April 1997.
The new government established a currency board in July 1997. Under
a currency board, banks must be much more careful when they make
loans. The question now is whether the banks are making enough loans
and whether they are making good decisions when they make their loans.
We will return to these questions in later sections.
As these examples illustrate, the movement from central planning to
market institutions brought with it a big change in the role of money. With
this must come a redefinition of the whole set of financial arrangements
and practices that support a monetized economy. Stiglitz (1992, p. 163)
lists eight functions that must be performed by financial institutions in a
market economy:
1) Management of the medium of exchange;
2) Transferring funds from savers to investors in new economic pro-
duction;
3) Pooling small amounts of savings so that larger projects can be un-
dertaken;
4) Choosing among projects so that the most productive projects re-
ceive the most support;
5) Monitoring the use of funds so that they are used in the intended
way;
6) Enforcement of loan contracts so that the loans are repaid;
7) Definition of how risks will be shared among borrowers and lenders
when new economic projects are undertaken;
8) Lowering of risk by creating methods for diversification of invest-
ment risks.
None of these functions was performed by the financial system under
central planning. Since money did not buy goods, even the management of
the medium of exchange, the first function, was done differently. The other
seven functions involve investment decisions, which were made by central
planners using very different criteria than the evaluation of risks and profits.
In creating its financial system, Bulgaria has been faced with the challenge
of creating institutional structures that will perform these necessary functions.
Although the functions of financial systems are consistent across capi-
talist countries, their structures vary significantly. For example, German
and Japanese banks are tied much more closely to nonfinancial firms than
in the United States. This reflects both cultural and historical differences.
During each stage of the transition, important choices were made regard-












other places, history does matter. Choices made during the early stages in-
fluenced later decisions as the new financial institutions began to take
shape. It is important, therefore, to understand how financial institutions
have evolved over time.
The development of a financial sector in Bulgaria began with reform of
the existing banking system. What was initially a monolithic bank was bro-
ken up into two tiers ≠ a central bank and commercial banks. Loans and
accounts of state enterprises were distributed among the new commercial
banks. Under central planning all savings accounts of individuals were
held at the State Savings Bank. This changed so that commercial banks
were allowed to accept deposits. While these changes created a structure
that superficially looked like the banking systems in capitalist economies,
more fundamental changes were required before the system could success-
fully perform basic financial market functions. Over time progress has
been made in improving the functioning the banks, but important ques-
tions still remain.
At this point, it is time to retrace our steps. We shall first expand the
discussion of the structure of financial institutions to which we have al-
luded by outlining the two-tier banking system as it is now codified in Bul-
garia. In the next three sections we will trace the development of the finan-
cial system during the transition period. We begin with commercial banks.
From the beginning of the transition they have been the most important
financial institutions in the Bulgarian economy. In Section III we look at a
broader set of financial institutions. Many of these institutions like the
capital market and pension funds played almost no role in the economy
before the financial crisis of 1996 and 1997. They still play only a small
role, but as we will see, they will be increasingly important as the financial
sector becomes more sophisticated. Then in Section IV we analyze the ef-
ficiency of the commercial banks. New financial institutions like the cur-
rency board were created to prevent further crises. In Section V we de-
scribe the functions of the Bulgarian National Bank in its new role as a
currency board.
We have said that the Bulgarian economy is monetized, but have not
discussed the formal Bulgarian definitions of money, an omission that will
be corrected in Section VI. This section also explains how the composition
of the money supply has changed over time. Section VII provides a for-
mula for the money supply and shows how various actions will affect the
money supply. Section VIII provides an overview of the performance of
the currency board and identifies some areas where potential problems
could arise. In the concluding section we shall briefly turn once again to
Stiglitzís functions of a financial system to assess the progress of Bulgarian
financial institutions in performing their new roles in a market economy
and discuss whether Bulgarian financial institutions will be able to meet









1 II. The Structure of the Commercial Banking Sector
The present section presents an overview of the key characteristics of
the banking sector in the Bulgarian economy. In the early transition period
financial sector reform began with the reestablishment of commercial
banks. Since then commercial banks have been the most important finan-
cial institutions in the economy.
1. Post-socialist Restoration, Crisis
and Development of Commercial Banks
During most of the communist era, all banking functions were the re-
sponsibility of the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), which had absorbed
through the process of nationalization all existing commercial banks. The
BNB was under the direct control of the Council of Ministers. Besides the
BNB there were only two other banks: the State Savings Bank, which was
the only bank permitted to hold the accounts of individuals and the Bul-
garian Foreign Trade Bank (now Bulbank), which handled all foreign ex-
change operations for the country. In 1987 specialized or sector-specific
commercial banks were formed, each restricted to lending in a particular
area such as the chemical industry or transportation.
At the end of 1989, following the dramatic political changes that year, ma-
jor institutional reform took place in the banking system as it moved to a two-
tier system with a central bank on one tier and many commercial banks on a
second tier. The sector-specific banks were then transformed into universal
banks which loaned to all sectors of the economy. At the same time, new lo-
cal commercial banks were created out of the 59 branches of the BNB.
In June 1991 the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank came into effect,
altering fundamentally the roles, objectives and functions of Bulgariaís
central and commercial banks. In 1992, another key financial act, the Law
on Banks and Credit Activity, was passed. This law established the regula-
tory framework for the activities of banking institutions. Under this law, all
banks, even state-owned banks, were given significant autonomy.
These more independent state-owned commercial banks quickly
proved to be very inefficient. They lacked lending expertise, and many
were very small. To overcome these problems the government established
the Bank Consolidation Company (BCC) to encourage the formation of
larger state-owned banks through mergers.
Outside this consolidation process, however, many new private banks
entered the market. Since only limited regulatory controls were in place at
the time, these banks operated in an environment without the regulatory
supervision found in developed market economies. In many instances the
financial resources needed to open these private banks was borrowed from
state-owned banks (or from other undetermined sources). The origins of
the private banks would shape their later behavior and contribute to the












Table 2.1 shows the number and type of banks in Bulgaria over the
1991 ≠ 2000 period. The patterns of entry and exit reflect the changing le-
gal and supervisory structure.
There are clearly two distinct periods. The 1991 ≠ 1995 period was
dominated by policies that promoted the development of comparatively
large state-owned banks while restricting the entry of foreign banks. The
total number of banks decreased as the Bank Consolidation Company en-
couraged small state-owned banks to merge. The total number of state-
owned banks fell from 72 in 1991 to 12 in 1995. During this same period,
25 small private Bulgarian banks entered the market. Not a single state-
owned bank was privatized.
At the outset of the reforms foreign banks were not allowed to open
branches in Bulgaria. Finally, in 1994, two foreign banks, the Greek Xios
Bank and the Dutch ING-Bank, set up branches in Sofia.2  By the end of
1995 two other banks had opened branches and three foreign banks re-
ceived full licenses from the Bulgarian regulators to open new banks in
Bulgaria.3  Still, these banks were very specialized, limiting their activities
to international settlements.4
Table 2.1
Number of Commercial Banks by Category
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Large Banks 3 4 6 9 9 6 6 6 7 8
Ownership
 State 3 4 6 9 9 6 5 4 4 2
 Private 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 6
Ownership by country
 Bulgarian 3 4 6 9 9 6 5 4 4 2
 Foreign 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 6
Small and Medium Banks 75 76 34 29 28 19 22 20 20 19
Ownership
 State 69 65 19 6 3 1 1 1 2 1
 Private 6 11 15 23 25 18 21 19 18 18
Ownership by country
 Bulgarian 75 76 34 29 25 14 14 12 11 10
 Foreign 0 0 0 0 3 5 8 8 9 9
Branches of Foreign Banks 0 0 0 2 4 4 5 7 7 8
Savings Banks 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Total 79 81 41 41 42 30 34 34 34 35
Source: BNB
2
 A bank is categorized as a foreign bank if over 50% of the equity capital is owned by
a  foreign legal entity or individual; otherwise, banks are categorized as  Bulgarian.
3 The National Bank of Greece and the Ionian Bank opened branches. Reifeisen Bul-
garia, BNP-Dresdner Bulgaria, and Bayerishe-Bulgarishe Handelsbank obtained Bulgar-
ian banking licenses.









1 Given their comparative advantages in reputation, viability, interna-
tional contacts and experience, these foreign banks were clearly in a posi-
tion to put strong competitive pressure on local Bulgarian banks. An im-
portant policy issue at that time was how much to restrict the entry of for-
eign banks into the Bulgarian market. Foreign banks could bring skills and
experience. On the other hand, Bulgarian banks needed time to become
fully competitive, and uncontrolled entry by foreign banks might have cre-
ated an environment where Bulgarian banks could not survive. The pro-
tectionist policies of the 1991 ≠ 1995 period were a compromise. Foreign
banks were allowed to enter, but only if they specialized in a limited range
of services.
Inadequate laws, insufficient institutional capacity and limited foreign
competition led to a number of problems during the 1991 ≠ 1995 period.
Bank managers were able to exploit loopholes in the law for private ad-
vantage at the expense of different goups of economic agents. In the case
of state owned banks managers exploited depositors, lenders and taxpay-
ers. In the private banks the controlling shareholders and managers often
colluded or acted together to prejudice the depositors, lenders, small pri-
vate shareholders, and taxpayers (by means of government bank rescue
mechanisms).
The level of bad loans soared as banks pursued misguided credit poli-
cies. Indeed, ë[u]ntil 1996, commercial credit was expanded to the nonfi-
nancial sector in Bulgaria to a degree that was unprecedented relative to
any other European transition economyí (OECD, 1999, p. 32). As Table
2.2 shows more than 74% of bank loans were nonperforming by 1995.
Many of these loans were unsecured (i. e. either there was no collateral
or the assets used as collateral were overvalued on the books).5  The risk
and maturity structure of assets and liabilities was poorly managed by the
banks, and internal audit systems were weak or nonexistent.
Table 2.2
Classification of Bank Loans in 1995 by Size of Banks (%)
Banks Performing Substandard Doubtful Uncollectable
(30 days overdue) (90 days overdue)
Large 17.3 64.3 3.9 14.5
Small and Medium 49.0 28.6 4.8 17.6
Total for the Banking System 25.9 54.5 4.2 15.4
Source: BNB, Annual Report, 1995
5
An additional problem during this period was the absence of a centralized collateral
registration office where banks could check to see if there was a lien on the asset.  Be-
cause banks were unaware of previous loans, borrowers were able to use the same asset as












While state-owned and private banks shared many of the same defi-
ciencies, there were also some significant differences. State-owned banks
had many loans to state-owned enterprises that dated back to the pre-re-
form period (pre-1989). The government tried to reduce the burden of
these loans by replacing these loans with government debt. The program
failed, in part however, because the government also continued to pressure
the banks to extend further loans to weak enterprises which were unable to
repay.6
Many private banks were established by entrepreneurs who wanted to
finance their other business activities. Even though large loans to bank
managers and owners were restricted by law, these laws were not generally
enforced. Often these loans to managers and owners of private banks were
not repaid.7
 As the banks grew weaker, the BNB provided more loans (i. e. refi-
nancing) to the banks to keep the larger banks from failing. In the process
the BNB lost control over the money supply (as these loans increased the
size of the monetary base), and inflation ensued. This led to the crisis in
the banking system in the second half of 1996 when the BNB placed 14
commercial banks under special supervision and later demanded that they
should be declared bankrupt.
Following the 1996 ≠ 1997 financial crisis, the Parliament passed two
new laws; one for the Bulgarian National Bank and another for the com-
mercial banks. These laws are designed to remedy the shortcomings of
earlier legislation and provide more resources for bank supervision and
regulation. The new Law on the Bulgarian National Bank altered the
structure of the BNB so that it was transformed into a currency board. The
currency board introduced strict controls over money supply.
Another important institutional change in the post-crisis period was the
introduction of the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). The Law on Bank De-
posit Guaranty, passed in April 1999, insures all commercial bank depos-
its of individuals and nonfinancial institutions up to BGN 6,900.8
All commercial banks must participate and pay insurance premiums
into the DIF.9  Annual premiums are 0.5% of the deposit base on 31 De-
6
 The largest program designed to help the banks was the ZUNK bond program of
1993. For a critical appraisal of this program, see Miller and Petranov (1996, chapter 8).
7 In 1997 an attempt was made to encourage delinquent borrowers to pay back old
loans. A list of delinquents was published. This list of the so called ëcredit millionairesí was
full of companies related to bank managers and owners.
8 The Fund guarantees 95% of deposits up to BGN 2,000. For deposits exceeding
BGN 2,000, the Fund guarantees 80% of the deposits on the next BGN 6,250. Thus, the
maximum amount a depositor can receive from the Fund is BGN 6,900. This is the maxi-
mum regardless of the number of deposit accounts at the bank or whether the deposit ac-
counts are in lev or foreign currency.
9 Branches of foreign banks are obliged to participate as well unless their mother insti-
tutions participate in a system of guarantees in their home country which provides the de-









1 cember of the preceding year. New banks must pay an entry fee within 30
days of the bankís registration equal to 1% of the bankís equity capital but
not less than BGN 100,000.
The funds held by the DIF are conservatively invested in high liquidity
low risk assets (i.e. government bonds, short-term commercial bank depos-
its and BNB deposits). Payments from the DIF are made when the Bulgar-
ian National Bank withdraws a banking license, and the bank has insuffi-
cient funds to cover its deposit liabilities.10
To further strengthen the banking sector, the IMF and the World Bank
encouraged the government to initiate a comprehensive program to priva-
tize all state-owned banks. The earlier policy carried out during the 1991 ≠
1995 period where the Bulgarian banking community was given an oppor-
tunity to develop under restrictions on foreign bank entry was deemed a
failure. Under the new policy the goal was to privatize the state banks
quickly and create foreign competition through extensive foreign owner-
ship of the banks.
 With the privatization of Bulbank, the largest bank in Bulgaria, only
three banks were still under state control at the end of 2000. These state-
owned banks hold less than 20% of total banking systemís assets.11  For-
eign banks can now enter the local market in three ways: purchase banks,
open branches or establish Bulgarian subsidiaries.12  All Bulgarian state-
owned banks that have been privatized (through 2000), were bought by
foreign institutions. The pattern of ownership in the banking sector has
changed radically. Once there was no foreign ownership, at the end of
2000 more than 73% of banking system assets were either in foreign
owned banks or branches of foreign banks. When Biochim and the State
Savings Bank are sold to foreigners, this number will rise to more than
90%.
Many of these foreign banks are well known international banks (i. e.
BNP and Unicredito). Others are less prominent institutions or off-shore
institutions registered in off-shore zones like Cyprus where disclosure rules
make it difficult to identify the owners.
Since most banks were privatized between 1998 ≠ 2000, it is still too
early to determine whether this strategy will be successful. If foreign banks
10
 During its first year and half, the DIF made payments to depositors of the Credit
Bank and Balkan Universal Bank when the Bulgarian National Bank withdrew their
banking licenses.
11 These banks are: Biochim Commercial Bank for which the government has launched
concrete plans for privatization; the State Savings Bank which is being reorganized in
preparation for privatization and the Encouragement Bank which was created specifically
to support small business.
12 Normally foreign banks have purchased state banks, but there is already an example
where a foreign bank bought a previously privatized bank. National Bank of Greece













bring experience and new products that foster competition, this will be a
successful policy. But if foreign banks do not support Bulgarian enter-
prises, channel scarce funds abroad, treat foreign companies preferentially
and do not develop a full range of banking services, then the economy will
continue to suffer from an inadequate financial system.
2. Dynamics and Structure of the Banking Sector
From 1991 to 2000 total bank assets in nominal terms rose from BGN
462.8 million to BGN 9.7 billion.13  See Table 2.3.
This enormous growth was entirely due to high inflation during this
period. If recalculated in dollar terms at the exchange rate effective in the
relevant year, total bank assets actually dropped from USD 21.2 billion to
USD 4.1 billion.
Table 2.3
Banking Sector Assets, Liabilities and Macroeconomic
Indicators (mln BGN, end-of-year)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total Bank Assets 462.8 582.3 809.5 1,071.7 1,088.9 3,300.6 8,076.2 7,588.6 8,223.4 9,773.5
Growth rates (%) 25.8 39.9 32.4 1.6 203.1 144.7 -6.0 8.4 18.8
Funds Attracted from
Nonfinancial Insitutions
and Clients 114.8 147.1 221.6 405.5 573.6 1425.9 5471.6 4933.9 5470.0
Growth rates (%) 28.1 50.6 82.0 41.5 148.6 283.7 -9.8 10.9
Claims on Nonfinancial
Institutions 164.4 218.6 281.3 434.5 461.6 1479.9 1843.6 1853.9 2399.4
Growth rates (%) 32.9 28.7 54.4 6.2 220.6 24.6 0.6 29.4
BNB Refinancing 18.8 16.3 22.7 36.4 25.0 84.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Growth rates (%) 16.7 44.4 60.4 -31.3 237.6 -100.0 0.0 0.0
Money Supply, M2 108.4 164.7 229.9 409.1 571.3 1,244.6 5,750.7 6,328.8 6,914.0
Growth rates (%) 51.9 39.6 77.9 39.6 117.9 362.1 10.1 9.2
Nominal GDP 135.7 200.8 298.9 543.4 880.3 1,748.7 17,055.0 21,570.7 22,776.4
Growth rates (%) 48.0 48.9 81.8 62.0 98.6 875.3 26.5 5.6
Source: BNB
As shown in Figure 2.1, the ratio of bank assets to the money supply
(M2) also fell sharply. A similar downward trend is evident in the ratio of
bank assets to nominal GDP. These ratios stabilized after 1998.
13
 These figures include the assets of all commercial banks and the SSB.  The SSB had


























A central function for commercial banks is financial intermediation.
One way to measure this activity is to look at data on funds attracted from
nonfinancial institutions (i. e. savers) and data on bank claims on nonfi-
nancial institutions (i. e. investors) (see Table 2.2). Funds attracted from
nonfinancial institutions and other customers are essentially funds in de-
posit accounts at banks. While these funds rose dramatically in nominal
terms between 1991 and 1999, this was again entirely due to inflation. In
dollar terms they fell to a little more than half their original level (USD 5.3
billion in 1991; USD 2.7 billion in 1999).
 Bank claims on nonfinancial institutions (i.e. bank lending) followed a
similar trend. While nominal growth was high, in dollar terms they fell dra-
matically from USD 7.5 billion in 1991 to USD 1.1 billion in 1999.
Bank behavior during the pre- and post-crisis period is clearly differ-
ent. In the 1991 ≠ 1995 period, banks borrowed heavily from the BNB or
from one another through the interbank market.14  As a result the share of
funds attracted from nonfinancial institutions was only 25% ≠ 50% of total
liabilities. At same time during this period lending policies were lax as
banks came under government pressure to extend loans to state-owned
enterprises and loans were extended to businesses with a relationship to
bank management teams. Bank claims on nonfinancial institutions were in
14
 Much of the activity on the interbank market was money being sold to commercial
banks by the State Savings Bank which dominated household deposits market  during this
period.   Ater the crisis the SSB continued to have a large share of this market although its
share droped as a result of increased competition.  It is difficult to determine precisely
SSBís share of total household deposits, but they have probably fallen from about 70 ≠












the range of 40% ≠ 50% of total bank assets, a relatively high share com-
pared to the post-crisis period and to the experience in other counties in
transition.15
Figure 2.2
Share of Funds Attracted from Nonfinancial Institutions
and Claims on Nonfinancial Institutions
















These ratios have changed since 1996. Under the currency board the
BNB cannot make loans to commercial banks, and the interbank money
market performs its normal function of providing only short-term and
emergency financing. As a result, the share of bank funds attracted from
nonfinancial institutions has increased to 65% ≠ 67%. At the same time,
banks have implemented new stricter lending requirements. Given the
high risk of lending to the real sector of the economy and more conserva-
tive bank credit policies, the relative share of bank claims on nonfinancial
institutions has declined to 25% ≠ 29%.
Intermediation is a central function of a banking system. An important
question is whether the Bulgarian banking system is performing this func-
tion well. In retrospect, it is clear that the banking system performed this
function very poorly during the pre-crisis period. Money that was deposited
with banks was lent to businesses that did not repay the loans. This is a
strong indication that savings was not invested properly. While it is better to
be careful with money than to waste it, the prospects for economic growth
would be far better if the banking system performed its intermediary func-
tion well and made good loans to the real sector of the economy. Thus far
for a large part of the period 1991 ≠ 1999 the banks have not demonstrated
widely that they have both the expertise and the motivation to do this.
15
 This ratio for Hungary is 40%, and is 30% in Poland. Publicly available Czech finan-










1 3. Is There Competition in the Banking Sector?
Competition in a sector is often gauged by the degree of concentration,
especially among the largest firms in an industry. Competition is considered to
be more intense when there are many companies of relatively the same size.
The Herfindahl index and the fourfirm-concentration ratio are commonly
used indicators of industrial concentration.16  The smaller the concentration
ratio the higher the level of competition. Table 2.4 provides several measures
of concentration in the Bulgarian banking sector. The Herfindahl index and
the concentration ratio are estimated on the basis of three indicators of bank
size: (1) total bank assets; (2) bank claims on nonfinancial institutions, and (3)
funds attracted from nonfinancial institutions and other customers.
Table 2.4
Measures of Concentration for the Banking Sector
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Bank Assets
Herfindahlís Index 0.38 0.33 0.30 0.15 0.11 0.19 0.12 0.11 0.12
Concentration Coefficient (%) 80.9 77.2 73.4 60.3 53.0 62.1 56.2 56.3 57.0
Claims on
Nonfinancial Insitutions
Herfindahlís Index 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.24 0.12 0.23 0.13 0.10 0.08




Herfindahlís Index 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.13
Concentration Coefficient (%) 66.2 59.2 57.3 54.7 57.5 62.6 56.3 58.9 61.7
Source: BNB
In general, the concentration measures followed a similar pattern over
the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. From 1991 to 1995 concentration lev-
els fell. In the immediate post-1995 period concentration increased as in-
solvent banks were closed. Then concentration decreased again over the
1997 ≠ 1999 period.
With respect to bank assets, the Herfindahl index shows a steady de-
cline between 1991 and 1995. It then rises slightly during the crisis in 1996
before declining again in the post-crisis period. Thus the index shows a
tendency towards a more even and balanced distribution of assets among
banks. The concentration ratio also declined over time with 57% of bank
assets in the four largest banks in 1999.
16





the share of company i in the sector. The index reaches its maximum value of one if there
is a monopolist in the market. The  concentration ratio is the sum of the market shares of












Claims on nonfinancial institutions show some contradictory trends.
The four largest banks lost market share, but the Herfindahl index rose
steadily during the 1991 ≠ 1995 period. This suggests that concentration
was rising, but this greater concentration was occurring below the level re-
ported by the four largest banks. This phenomenon can be attributed to
the ZUNK Law. Enacted in 1994 this act allowed banks to substitute gov-
ernment debt (ZUNK bonds) for state-owned enterprise nonperforming
credit, this reduced the level of claims on nonfinancial institutions. Large
state-owned banks were the main beneficiaries of this program.
 Following 1996, both the concentration ratio and the Herfindahl index
based on claims on nonfinancial institutions reported a significant decline,
reflecting growing competition in the lending market.
The Herfindahl measure for funds attracted from nonfinancial institu-
tions remained relatively stable over the entire 1991 ≠ 1999 period al-
though it decreased slightly during 1991 ≠ 1994. The four-firm concentra-
tion ratio, on the other hand, declined steadily throughout the period. As
pointed out above, the amount of funds attracted declined dramatically in
real terms over this period. As the amount declined, competition intensi-
fied. In the post-crisis period, these competition indicators have changed
little as the economy stabilized and inflation fell. These changes also re-
flect the reorientation of the banks over this period. During the 1991 ≠
1994 period, many banks began to build their branch networks attempting
to attract household deposits in addition to enterprise deposits. As a result,
the SSB, which had dominated this market segment, lost much of its mar-
ket share.
There are many aspects and dimensions of banking sector competition.
Over the first decade of transition, bank services have became more di-
verse. New types of deposits are now offered, credit and debit cards are
available and e-banking services are being developed, although on a very
limited scale. While these services cannot match the diversity and quality
of services in the developed market economies, they are expanding.
While banks competed to supply new financial services, price competi-
tion has not been so evident. As Table 2.5 shows, the spread between de-
posit and loan interest rates has been high throughout the 1990s. In the
pre-crisis period this relatively high interest rate spread reflected the finan-
cial difficulties of troubled state-owned banks. Interestingly, the new pri-
vate banks did not opt to compete by offering narrower spreads. Instead,
competition was directed towards offering new services and banks made
an all out effort to capture new customers. The high spreads in the early
1990s were also a result of the common interest rate policy.17  During the
financial crisis the spreads became very high as inflation volatility threat-
17
 This was a policy coordinated within the Association of Commercial Banks in the










1 ened bank profits. After 1997 with the establishment of the currency
board, spreads have fallen but they remain very high at 8% ≠ 9%. These
spreads are especially high considering that inflation has stabilized and in-
terest rates on deposits have fallen to the 3% ≠ 4% level.
The reasons for these large spreads deserve further study. Low deposit
rates discourage savings and high credit rates discourage investment. Two
possible explanations include: (1) a lack of competition and (2) a risky
loan environment. The banks have a dominant position from the view-
point of the saver since the capital market still does not provide a viable
alternative. Private sector pension funds are just beginning their opera-
tions and investing abroad was forbidden until 2000. It is not easy for most
people to invest in government bonds which would give them almost the
same rate of return. In short, there are still no alternatives comparable to
bank deposits. Furthermore, there is little competition within the banking
sector. With the exception of the largest cities, there are only one or two
bank branches in a town, which is not enough to generate strong competi-
tion.
Table 2.5
Annual Interest Rate Spreads and Deposits Rates
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Interest Rate Spread 18.3 26.3 37.5 36.1 153.8 129.0 11.1 10.3 9.2
Deposit Intersest Rate 55.8 52.0 65.1 43.7 146.4 80.8 3.0 3.3 3.0
Spread/Deposit Rate 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.6 3.7 3.1 3.1
Source: BNB, authors’ calculations.
18
On the credit side, high interest rates may reflect high risks related to
changing ownership structure, changing management, limited markets,
and unstable economic conditions that are still part of the economic land-
scape in Bulgaria. But lack of competition may also be an important issue
here as well. Because the capital markets are still so undeveloped, enter-
prises that need credit have no other place to go but the banks.
4. Conclusion
The commercial banking sector went through enormous change during
the last decade of the 20th century. The early part of the 1990s was a pe-
riod of extensive institutional reform. These reforms were unsuccessful,
and there was a major financial crisis in 1996 ≠ 1997. The period since the
crisis has produced greater stability as new institutions have been put into
place, but there are still many challenges ahead. The sector is still domi-
nated by large banks. Due to high risk and lack of competition, interest
18












rate spreads are too great. Banks loan too small a part of their funds to the
real sector of the economy and channel a lot of scarce funds abroad. The
financial services market is still heavily segmented, and the competitive
pressure of foreign financial institutions while steadily growing, remains
weak. Most of the banking sector has been privatized by foreign investors,
but this has yet to bring about a significant change in the quality or in the
range of services offered.
III. Nonbank Financial Institutions19
The establishment of the currency board, and the financial stabili-
zation that has come with it coincided with the end of the first wave of
mass privatization. This first wave was modeled after an earlier Czech pro-
gram where citizens paid a small fee for vouchers that could be used to bid
for shares in state-owned enterprises in national auctions. (Miller and
Petranov, 2000a)
Once the mass privatization auctions were concluded, there was in-
creased pressure to develop new capital markets so that the new shares
could be traded. New regulations were passed and, unlike the Czechs who
did not establish a regulatory agency immediately, a Securities and Stock
Exchange Commission (SSEC) was created in Bulgaria.
At about the same time pressures began to build to find better ways
to manage the pension system. The value of state pensions had seriously
eroded during the early 1990s, and the government turned its attention to
creating private institutions that could provide additional channels for re-
tirement savings.
Increased stability and lower inflation since the establishment of the
currency board also made it easier for a private insurance market to de-
velop. By passing new laws and making it more difficult to obtain a li-
cense, the government was also able to reduce mafia influence that had
been very extensive in the insurance industry. The next section presents
an overview of recent developments in the capital markets. These markets
have gotten off to a rocky start with low volume and poor liquidity. The
insurance industry, which is analyzed in Section 2, has experienced the
most growth among nonbank financial sectors but is still relatively small.
New pension systems are beginning to expand and should show more
rapid growth in the future. An analysis of these developments is presented
in Section 3.
19









1 1. Capital Market and Capital Market Institutions
1.1. Laws and Institutions
1.1.1. The Legal Basis for Capital Market Institutions
In June 1995 the Law on Securities, Exchange and Investment Compa-
nies (LSSEIC) was passed and actions were undertaken to create a regula-
tory structure and reorganize the capital market. The Securities and Ex-
change Commission [now the State Securities Commission (SSC)] was
then established (January 1996) and the Central Depository opened (Au-
gust 1996). Following the last auctions in the first wave of mass
privatization, the Sofia Stock Exchange and the Bulgarian Stock Exchange
merged and formed the Bulgaria Stock Exchange ≠ Sofia (BSE ≠ Sofia).
This new exchange opened in October 1997. The LSSEIC was later
amended and in 2000 was supersceded by the Law on the Public Offering
of Securities (LPOS). The changes incorporated in LPOS reflect experi-
ence gained during the early years of capital market development and
bring Bulgarian law into close alignment with the EU acquis. While it is
too early to judge what the full impact of these changes will be, there al-
ready appears to be improvement in general corporate governance proce-
dures.
1.1.2. Bulgarian Stock Exchange ≠ Sofia
The BSE ≠ Sofia operates three separate markets, i. e. an official mar-
ket, a free market and a bond market. In addition, there is also a separate
market where shares of state-owned enterprises are sold as a part of the
stateís privatization program. The official stock market is subdivided into
three segments. The specific listing standards for each segment are given
in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1
BSE Official Market Listing Standards
Segment A Segment B Segment C
Completed years with
audited financial statements At least 3 At least 2 At least 1
Market capitalization At least BGN 20 At least BGN 10 At least BGN 500,000
million million
Part of the issue owned by
minority shareholders (%) At least 25% At least 10% At least 5%
Number of shareholders At least 400 At least 100 At least 100
Average monthly turnover ≠
number of shares At least 1,000 At least 1,000 The issue should
consist of minimum
50,000 shares












Municipal and corporate bonds can also be listed on the bond market.
New bond issues must be at least BGN 1 million, and the maturity must be
at least 6 months. Issuers of corporate bonds must have completed at least
three financial years. Government securities could also be listed on the
bond market but are not presently intensively traded because their market
is technically organized by the BNB.
Although the barriers to official market listing are very low, there are
still very few market participants. For individuals, trading directly in the
market is relatively expensive. Few companies have tried to raise addi-
tional capital by issuing new bonds and none have tried by issuing shares.
The BSE ≠ Sofia is organized as a joint-stock company, the state has a
37.6% interest, and the remaining shares are owned by financial institu-
tions, i.e. banks, investment intermediaries, financial brokerage houses and
insurance companies. BSE ≠ Sofia is managed by a Board of Directors
which is responsible for the operations of the exchange. All decisions as to
membership, trade in securities and sanctions against stock exchange
members are coordinated through a five member ad hoc committee with
representation from shareholders in the exchange, members of the ex-
change, stockbrokers and issuers of securities. The BSE ≠ Sofia has also
established a court of arbitration and a guarantee fund to guarantee trans-
parency of transactions, equal treatment of traders and strict observance of
obligations.
The BSE ≠ Sofia is striving to improve its operation by focusing on the
trading system and the clearing and settlement system. It is trying to im-
prove its information technology systems and even create a system where
remote trades can take place. Nevertheless declining turnover jeopardizes
the viability of the stock exchange as an institution. While the stock ex-
change reported a profit in 1998, in 1999 it registered losses of
BGN 56,000. Losses are even higher for the financial year 2000:
BGN 106,000.
1.1.3. The State Securities Commission
The State Securities Commission (SSC) was established to ensure pro-
tection of investorsí interests and promote the development of the securi-
ties market. The seven officers of the Commission are appointed by the
Council of Ministers on the recommendation of the Finance Minister. Of-
ficers serve for 5 years.
The Commission regulates the issuance of new securities and monitors
transactions in securities. It oversees the establishment and operation of
stock exchanges, investment intermediaries and investment companies. It
also proposes and drafts new legislation. For example, the Commission
deserves credit for the important role it played in bringing LPOS, the new









1 Licensing and supervision are at the core of the Commissionís activity.
Institutions regulated by the Commission are required to submit reports to
the Commission on a regular basis and notify the Commission of impor-
tant changes. The Commission can require the disclosure of information
and/or carry out on-site inspections. If the Commission finds violations or
identifies an investor who needs protection, the Commission can authorize
and impose sanctions and administrative penalties directly.
Central Depository
Under LPOS (as well as previously under the LSEIC), all companies
that offer their shares publicly have dematerialised shares (i. e. bookkeep-
ing entries only) , and their shareholder registration books are kept by the
Central Depository. The Depository is also responsible for the settlement
of transactions (i. e. it also acts as a transfer agent).
The Depository was established as a joint-stock company in August
1996. The companyís shareholders include the BNB, the Ministry of Fi-
nance, commercial banks and investment intermediaries. The Depository
has a five member Board of Directors. Two members are representatives
of the BNB and the Ministry of Finance. Either the BNB or the Finance
Ministry can veto decisions of the General Meeting of Shareholders.
All transactions must take place on the BSE ≠ Sofia and must be re-
corded by the Depository. Since only Depository members are authorized
to carry out registrations, all transactions must be negotiated via invest-
ment intermediaries who are also members of the Depository. Clearing
and settlement are guaranteed within three days.20
The establishment of the Depository has greatly facilitated trade and
transactions in securities. In other transition economies where shareholder
books are kept by the companies themselves, the accuracy of these records
have been questioned, further eroding confidence in the markets. There
have only been a few controversies regarding shareholder registrations in
Bulgaria, and there is confidence that transactions in securities are timely
and accurately filed.
Investment Intermediaries
Under LPOS, all transactions on the BSE ≠ Sofia must be concluded
by licensed investment intermediaries. Nonbank investment intermedia-
tion licenses are issued by the SSC. When banks obtain their banking li-
censes from the BNB, they also receive a license as investment intermedi-
aries. Still banks are required to register with the SSC as agents carrying
out investment intermediation.
20
 Until the end of 2000, it was possible to carry out off-the-exchange transactions un-
der very limited conditions. This loophole was exploited by some traders and substantial
trading actually took place off the exchange. See Petranov and Miller (1999) for a more












To trade on the BSE ≠ Sofia an intermediary must become a member
of the exchange, and establish a trading post manned by stockbrokers cer-
tified by the SSC. The SSC also reviews the capital adequacy, liquidity,
and managerial competence of investment intermediaries. The SSC issues
two types of licenses: partial licenses allowing intermediaries to render
brokerage services and full licenses which also allow intermediaries to deal
on their own account and underwrite new issues.
By mid-2000, there were 101 licensed investment intermediaries of
which 29 were commercial banks. For such a small and shrinking market,
this is a large number. Seven or eight large investment intermediaries con-
trol between 55% ≠ 65% of the BSE ≠ Sofia turnover and the twenty most
active intermediaries account for about 80%.
Given this situation, investment intermediaries have opted for reducing
operating costs and have turned to trading off-the-exchange instruments
like compensatory notes.21  Table 3.2 shows how the situation has changed.
While the number of intermediaries has been increasing slowly, many in-
termediaries are not members of the BSE ≠ Sofia and do not have trading
posts. These firms do not attach great importance to on-the-exchange busi-
ness and are mostly involved in outside activities like trading in compensa-
tory notes.
Table 3.2
 Number of Investment Intermediaries
(including commercial banks)
31.12.1998 30.06.1999 31.12.1999 31.06.2000
Licensed by SSC 78 92 97 101
Deregistered by SSC 0 1 1 2
Members of BSE ≠ Sofia 61 73 76 78
Source: Public Register of SSC.
1.1.4. Investment Companies
An important part of the mass privatization program was the participa-
tion of privatization funds. These funds collected vouchers from citizens
and then used these vouchers to bid for firms in the privatization auctions.
After the first round of the mass privatization program concluded, these
funds became investment companies.
Later, however, these companies were required to declare themselves
holding companies or continue their status as investment companies.
Holding companies can make loans to companies in which they hold 25%
21
 Compensatory notes are notes created as part of the restitution process. These notes
have been given to previous owners of property that could not be physically returned. The









1 or more of the shares.22  Investment companies are intended to have more
diversified portfolios and are not permitted to hold more than 10% of the
shares in any one company.
All but five of the original privatization funds became holding compa-
nies.23 As a result there are only five registered investment companies now.
Four became closed-end companies and only one, Zlaten Lev, became an
open-end fund. Unfortunately, no special legislation was passed to regu-
late holding companies so, even though they are really financial institu-
tions, they are operating under the general commercial code. This is a po-
tentially dangerous situation for the financial sector.
1.2. General Conditions of the Capital Market
In spite of establishing extensive market institutions and regulatory
agencies, trading has been so light that it threatens the viability of the mar-
ket and raises important issues regarding the mass privatization program
upon which the capital markets were built.
Stocks, as measured by the Warburg 30 Index of the largest market
capitalization stocks, performed most successfully in the initial period. The
index was set to 100 in December 1997. The index reached its high in May
1998 at 165 but fell to 67 in late 2000. Other market indicators have fol-
lowed a similar trend. For instance, total market capitalization peaked in
the second quarter of 1998 at BGN 3 billion but had fallen to BGN 1 bil-
lion by mid-2000.
Market activity has also fallen over the 1999 ≠ 2000 period. The num-
ber of listed companies has declined and activity has diminished24 . Large
block trades are an important percentage of overall turnover. During the
early months of 1998 there were a large number of block trades as previ-
ous agreements made between privatization funds or between foreign in-
vestors and privatization funds during the voucher auctions were settled.
After a lull, block trades are again an important part of overall turn-
over in the market. Block trades, although they are recorded as taking
place on the exchange, are not normal trades. These are agreements nego-
tiated off the exchange and reflect attempts by large shareholders to gain
more concentrated ownership positions. A better gauge of the liquidity of
the BSE ≠ Sofia auction market is turnover and the number of nonblock
22
 In the present environment where the banks are providing little credit and interest
rates on loans are high, these loans can benefit both the holding companies and the com-
panies in their portfolios. The loans provide liquidity to the companies, and the holding
companies which often have representatives on the board can evaluate the risk.
23 One company Zlaten Lev split into two parts. One part is a holding company and the
other continues to be an investment company.
24 The new LPOS allowed that small companies (with registered capital less than
BGN 200,000) whose shares were initially auctioned in the mass privatization to become
closed companies trough a decision of the General Meeting of Shareholders. Many com-












market transactions. As Table 3.3 shows, liquidity has fallen dramatically
based on both of these measures. Transactions in the first two quarters of
2000 were occurring at about half the rate they were in 1998. Turnover has
fallen from a high of BGN 52.0 million in the second quarter of 1998 to
only BGN 11.1 million during the entire last six months of 2000.25
Table 3.3 shows large increases in both regular and block trading in the
last quarter of 2000. This increase reflects new rules requiring that all trad-
ing take place on the BSE ≠ Sofia. It has been estimated that 82% of all
shares were traded off the exchange in 1999. In the last quarter of 2000 the
Central Depository started recording transfers of shares only from the
stock exchange. Thus the increase in trading in the table probably reflects
a shift from off- the-exchange- trading to on- the-exchange trading rather
than a true increase in the number of shares traded.26
The increase in bond trading in 2000 reflects two changes. Private
companies issued two new bonds, and it became technically possible to
trade some government securities on the BSE ≠ Sofia.
25
 The total turnover including block trading is BGN 65 million. This compares with
turnover on the Prague market of approximately USD 750 million and turnover on the
Warsaw exchange of more than USD 2 billion. Some analysts believe that the Prague and
Warsaw exchanges are too small to survive.
26 Off-the-exchange transactions have been a serious problem since the very beginning
of the exchange trade. Initially it was intended that all transactions in shares of companies
that participated in the mass privatization program have to take place on the stock ex-
change. This restriction represented an attempt to seek better price integrity and market
transparency. Even block trades that are negotiated off the exchange must be registered
on the exchange. The only transactions that were allowed to take place off the exchange
are swaps and dealings between individuals. In spite of these restrictions off-the-exchange










Indicators of trade on BSE- Sofia
1998 1999 2000
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Official Market
No. Companies 1 4 10 19 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
No. Shares (million) 0.247 0.444 0.912 1.365 0.546 0.611 0.265 0.928 0.467 3.906 0.260 0.222
No. Transactions 193 166 1,269 1,753 2,047 1,807 808 1,222 1,150 1,340 973 1,448
Turnover (million BGN) 5.2 8.7 3.4 2.7 1.4 7.6 0.6 1.6 0.9 1.5 6.0 0.2
Mkt Capitalization
(million BGN) 17.5 48.1 182.4 243.4 268.5 268.2 242.1 219.1 255.6 325.0 277.2 283.5
Free Market
No. Companies 322 983 983 979 844 844 826 828 811 734 545 478
No. Shares (million ) 1.626 5.776 4.236 2.704 1.287 0.624 0.479 2.804 0.810 1.266 0.375 5.908
No. Transactions 277 4,903 6,376 4,141 3,982 2,711 935 1,757 1,494 1,463 809 1,318
Turnover (million BGN) 16.5 43.3 39.3 33.6 11.3 4.1 2.8 14.5 6.6 4.8 1.3 10.9
Mkt Capitalization
(million BGN) 1,824 3,094 1,655 1,092 1,452 1,324 1,203 1,154 1,152 1,012 914 1,003
Subtotal
No. Shares (million ) 1.872 6.220 5.148 4.068 1.833 1.235 0.744 3.732 1.277 5.172 0.634 6.131
No. Transactions 470 5 069 7 645 5 894 6 029 4 518 1 743 2 979 2 644 2 803 1 782 2 766
Turnover (million BGN) 21.8 52.0 42.7 36.3 12.8 11.7 3.4 16.0 7.4 6.3 7.3 11.1
Block Trading
No. Shares (million ) 6.629 1.942 0.000 0.336 4.331 1.821 1.603 2.848 2.645 5.817 1.377 18.062
No. Transactions 318 117 0 8 51 42 14 46 46 40 29 157
Turnover (million BGN) 53.7 5.2 0.00 1.8 38.1 16.7 3.7 15.9 14.8 7.9 13.6 54.7
Bond Market
No. Companies 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2
No. Bonds 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,235 1,007 20 1 1,1449 16,805
No. Transactions 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 12 1 1 17 21
Turnover (million BGN) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.2 2.4
Total
No. Shares (million ) 8.5 8.2 5.2 4.4 6.2 3.1 2.4 6.6 3.9 11.0 2.0 24.2
No. Transactions 788 5,186 7,645 5,902 6,080 4,560 1,780 3,037 2,691 2,844 1,828 2,944
Turnover (million BGN) 75.5 57.3 42.7 38.2 50.9 28.5 7.4 32.2 22.3 14.2 22.0 68.3
Source: BSE − Sofia.
In spite of the high cost of borrowing from banks, the capital market
has provided only a limited alternative. Investment banking has not really
developed. At the end of 2000, there had been only two offerings of corpo-












the lack of investment banking is due to a lack of interest in new issues or
inadequately trained investment bankers.
Why have the capital markets developed so slowly?27  There are several
factors. Some are external factors like the 1998 crisis in Russia and subse-
quent withdrawal of international investors from risky emerging markets.
Other problems are internal, however. The core problem lies with the very
genesis of the Bulgarian capital market in the mass privatization program.
Over one thousand companies initially traded on the BSE ≠ Sofia were
part of the mass privatization program. Unlike companies in the West that
come to the capital market to acquire new financing, these companies
were registered as public companies in a purely administrative way without
having any economic motivation to become publicly traded companies.28
Another important reason for the slow development of the capital mar-
ket is that the government has failed to take important steps to help the
markets expand. While new laws like LPOS should improve market condi-
tions, it is important that efforts be made to ensure that the law is effec-
tively enforced. This is particularly important if good corporate gover-
nance is going to be supported and shareholdersí rights protected. The
government could provide further support for the market if new laws were
passed that provided equal tax treatment of all institutional investors and
motivation for companies to go public.29
Several other transition economies have been successful in creating vi-
able capital markets. Bulgaria has passed good legislation and established
appropriate institutions to promote its capital market. Some big issues re-
main, however. It is important that the government take a more active role
in promoting the market by ensuring that new laws are enforced and
shareholder rights are protected. It can also help broaden the market by
completing the sale of important companies like the telecommunications
company.
 2. Insurance
Before 1997 there was weak regulation of the insurance industry and
few requirements to promote transparency. There were questions about
whether insurance companiesí capital came from legitimate sources and a
number of powerful insurers were mafia-like businesses which often re-
sorted to strong arm tactics.
27
 For a comparison between the capital market performance in other transition econo-
mies, see  Johnson and Shleifer (1999),  Pohl, et.al., (1995), World Bank (1999) and
OECD (1998).
28 For further details on the impact of the genesis of the capital market on its future de-
velopment, see Petranov and Miller (1999).
29 For further information on the possible economic policy measures of the government









1 In 1997 and 1998, the insurance sector in Bulgaria was thoroughly re-
structured when the Insurance Law was substantially amended. Stricter re-
quirements on insurers were imposed and the National Insurance Council
(reporting to the Council of Ministers) and the Insurance Supervision Di-
rectorate (under the Ministry of Finance) were created to regulate the in-
dustry.
 The highest regulatory body is the National Insurance Council. The
Council has seven members with representatives from the Minister of Fi-
nance, the Minister of Justice, and the Minister of the Interior, and the
CEO of the Insurance Supervision Directorate. The Council is chaired by
the Finance Minister. It is responsible for licensing, authorization of merg-
ers and divestitures, and bringing insolvency/bankruptcy proceedings.
The Insurance Supervision Directorate is responsible for daily regula-
tory matters. The CEO is appointed by the Prime Minister on the recom-
mendation of the National Insurance Council. The Insurance Supervision
Directorate monitors the overall activities of insurance companies and in-
surance brokers. These include control over products offered and insur-
ance premiums charged. The Directorate also authorizes the promotion of
new insurance products, determines the minimum premium amount on
compulsory insurance and approves the annual reinsurance programs of
insurers. It may also undertake certain administrative measures to stabilize
the financial condition of insurance companies and oversee the sale of in-
surance portfolios when an insurer is undergoing liquidation.
Since the beginning of 1998 the National Insurance Council has insti-
tuted new licensing procedures for insurance companies and mutual insur-
ance societies to bring insurers into compliance with the 1997 amendments
to the Insurance Act. Most companies (87 out of 112) failed to meet the
new stricter requirements and lost their licenses. Seventeen new joint-stock
property insurance companies and another six life insurance companies
and four mutual insurance societies were licensed in 1998.
Table 3.4 shows how the structure of the sector changed between 1997
and 1999. The sector is highly concentrated. In 1999 the State Insurance
Institute ≠ General Insurance, the largest property insurance company, ac-
counted for nearly 30% of the market. The four largest companies con-
trolled 70.2% of the market. The concentration of life insurance compa-
nies was even higher. In 1999, the State Insurance Institute had a market
share of 62.4% and the four largest insurance companies 91.7%. Both the
Herfindahl index and the four firm concentration ratio provide evidence
that the sector is becoming more competitive, but concentration remains
high.
In 2000 the largest companies in both segments of the insurance mar-
ket were state-owned. Two other insurance companies were state-owned,












controlled by the Sofia Municipality. The remaining companies were pri-
vate, although there was an indirect state interest in some companies e.g.
Bulstrad PLC. which was privatized. The gradual increase in the number
of new private companies, the privatization of state-owned companies, and
the entry into the Bulgarian market of well-established foreign insurance
companies are positive signs that the insurance industry will continue to
grow.
Table 3.4
Structure of the Insurance Sector
General Insurance Life Insurance
1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999
Number of insurance companies* na 17 18 na 10 12
 State-owned 3 4 3 2 2 1
 Private na 13 15 na 8 11
 O/w foreign companies** 0 3 6 0 0 3
 O/w mutual insurance societies na 0 0 na 4 5
Herfindahl index*** 0.458 0.421 0.384 0.774 0.756 0.658
Four-Firm Concentration ratio (%)*** 84.1 76.4 70.2 97.2 94.1 91.8
 * In 1997 the number of insurers (joint-stock companies and mutual insurance societ-
ies) totaled 112. Data, however, were not reliable enough to treat them in separate
groups.
 ** Insurance companies with foreign shareholders owning over 50% of their capital.
*** 1997 estimates draw upon the market shares of the insurers licensed to operate in
compliance with the amendments to the Insurance Law.
Source: Annual Report of the Insurance Supervision Directorate; Authors’ Calculations.
Between 1997 and 1999, general insurance generated 90% of premium
income. (Table 3.5) Total income from premiums in both segments, i.e.
general insurance and life insurance, grew by almost 88% over two years.
Table 3.5
Total Income from Premiums for the Insurance Sector
in Bulgaria (millions of BGN)
1997 1998 1999
General Insurance 147.3 204.5 278.1
Life Insurance 17.5 28.3 31.6
 Shareholding companies 17.5 27.6 30.9
 Cooperatives 0.0 0.7 0.7
Total 164.8 232.8  309.7
Source: Annual Report of the Insurance Supervision Directorate.









1 income from insurance premiums was only 1.36% of GDP in 1999 (see
Table 3.6). This is far below other countries in transition. For example, in
1997 insurance premiums were 2.89% of GDP in the Czech Republic, 2.74
in Poland and 2.33 in Hungary. The penetration was 6.53% in Germany
and 1.74% in Greece which has the smallest insurance sector in the EU.
Table 3.6
Macroeconomic and Insurance Sector Indicators
1997 1998 1999
GDP (current prices, million BGN) 17,055.2 21,577.0 22,776.0
Gross Income from Premiums (million BGN) 164.8 232.8 309.8
Insurance Penetration (% of GDP) 0.97 1.08 1.36
Population (thousand) 8,283.2 8,230.3 8,190.8
Insurance Density (BGN) 19.9 28.2 37.82
Labor Force (thousand) 4,749.5 4,749.7 4,752.8
No. of Individuals w/ Life Insurance Policies (thousand) - 1374.1 1,688.9
Percentage of labor force w/ Life Insurance Policies - 28.9 35.5
Source: National Statistical Institute; Annual Report of the Insurance Supervision Directorate.
Under the Insurance Law, all insurance companies must invest insur-
ance reserves in certain instruments. Furthermore, the structure of the
various investment categories within total insurance reserves is also subject
to regulation. At least 50% of reserves must be invested in bank deposits
or government securities. In addition there are further limitations on other
holdings: real estate cannot exceed 10% of total reserves; the share of mu-
nicipal bonds cannot exceed 5%, and the share of corporate securities can-
not surpass 30%.
Because the sector has been expanding, total assets and total insurance
reserves have grown quickly. The insurance business, as a whole, is profit-
able, although some smaller companies have experienced losses in certain
years (see Table 3.7).
Presently, insurance companies are pursuing very conservative invest-
ment strategies. Very few financial instruments meet their investment
needs. The poor liquidity of most shares on the stock exchange has dis-
couraged insurers from actively participating in the capital market. Fur-
thermore, they do not have the expertise, information or experience to in-
vest in risky assets. As a result, they tend to invest their reserves almost
exclusively in bank deposits and medium and long-term government secu-
rities (see Table 3.7). This is a very low risk strategy, but it also means very













 Net Profit, Total Assets and Reserves
of the Insurance Sector (million BGN)
General Insurance Life Insurance
1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999
Net Profit 0.31 3.09 5.96 0.28 0.54 0.88
Total Assets 165.0 261.4 355.9 194.0 178.2 188.3
Total Reserves 39.6 86.4 103.2 108.5 86.8 79.0
Distribution of Reserves (%)
Government Securities 3.7 13.5 40.7 53.2 56.9 75.6
Real Estate 0.0 8.6 5.18 0.7 1.7 8.0
Municipal Bonds 0.0 0.0 0.09 0.0 0.0 0.2
Corporate Securities 0.0 1.2 1.94 0.2 3.5 0.3
Bank Deposits 96.3 76.7 52.08 45.6 37.8 15.7
Loans against Life Insurance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1
Source: Insurance Supervision Directorate, Annual Report.
3. Pension and Health Insurance Funds
The first private pension funds were established in 1994. They started
operating without any specific legal framework or regulation, drawing
upon the general provisions of the Law on Commerce. In early 1999 there
were 30 registered pension funds, but only a few were operating actually in
2000.
The retirement system now has three pillars. The first pillar is the exist-
ing mandatory state operated ëpay-as-you-goí social security system. The
second pillar provides additional obligatory pension insurance for certain
professions with high risk jobs and for individuals born after 31.12.1960.
Employers and employees are required to make insurance contributions to
special private pension funds. Employees have a choice of funds. The third
pillar embraces the whole system of additional voluntary insurance. This
third pillar is defined contribution pension insurance purchased by indi-
viduals on the free market from licensed pension insurance companies. In
1999 the Law on Additional Voluntary Pension Insurance (LAVPI) was
passed. This Law provides a legal basis for the third pillar. LAVPI pro-
vides for state regulation and control of pension insurance companies and
pension funds. The State Agency for Social Security Supervision under the
Council of Ministers was established under the Law. The Agency is autho-
rized to license and regulate companies selling pension insurance. The
Agency is a legal entity funded by government with annual appropriations.
The Council of Ministers is responsible for appointing the chairman of the
agency and determining the number of staff. The law also establishes a









1 representing various ministries and the SSC. The Council is assisted by a
representative of the Association of Companies for Additional Pension In-
surance who performs advisory functions. The Council is chaired and con-
vened by the Minister of Labor and Social Policy on a regular basis. It
makes decisions regarding licensing and authorizes the merger or divesti-
ture decisions of companies. Under LAVPI, the State Agency for Social
Security Supervision began licensing pension insurance companies. Out of
thirty original pension insurance companies only nine were able to meet
the new stricter requirements and were granted licenses to establish and
manage pension funds. It is estimated that at the end of 2000 the licensed
pension insurance funds in Bulgaria manage BGN 50 million obtained
from contributions from about 500,000 people.
Legally, pension funds are required to meet specific requirements and
comply with a number of restrictions in implementing their investment
policy. Investments are limited to certain instruments. Pension funds must
invest at least 50% of their assets in government securities or bank depos-
its. There are also other restrictions. For example, no more than 10% of
the assets can be invested in real estate and mortgages and no more than
10% of their assets can be invested abroad.
A special feature of the Bulgarian system is that licensed pension insur-
ance companies can also establish funds for which pension premiums can
be paid by investment bonds obtained as vouchers in the second wave of
mass privatization program. However, most companies privatized so far in
the second wave of the privatization program are in poor financial condi-
tion so their shares have been very illiquid. For this reason, investment
bonds are considered unattractive asset for pension funds.
Indeed there are real potential problems here for the pension funds. If
premiums are paid in investment bonds, the assets of pension funds will then
consist of highly illiquid securities. At the same time, pension funds must
make regular pension payments. This mismatch between the liquidity of as-
sets and liabilities could destabilize the funds. For this reason, no licensed
pension insurance company has decided to start such a pension fund.30
Pension funds should play an important role as the financial system de-
velops. Because contributions to the ësecond pillarí pension funds are man-
datory, they should grow rapidly once some technical start-up problems
are solved.
Health insurance, as provided for by the Health Insurance Law, and
the pension insurance system have similar structures. Besides the manda-
tory health insurance system implemented by the state, there will also be
funds for supplementary health insurance. Companies providing supple-
mentary health insurance must be licensed by the State Agency for Insur-
30
 In the second wave of the mass privatization program using investment bonds as pen-
sion payments was supposed to support the mass privatization program. The program so












ance Supervision. As 2000 drew to a close, there were no licensed health
insurance funds as the licensing procedure needs further clarification.
4. Other Financial Services
Other financial institutions that are commonly found in countries with
more developed financial markets have not made serious inroads in Bul-
garia. In part this is due to the breadth of activities in Bulgariaís universal
banks. For example, the development of mortgage banks, investment
banks, savings banks, savings and loan associations, finance companies,
leasing companies and public financial agencies is very limited.
 Only four commercial banks extend housing loans backed by real es-
tate as collateral. This activity may expand, however. The Mortgage Bonds
Law (admitted in October 2000) details the rules for underwriting and
trade in mortgage bonds. The expectation is that banks will be able to at-
tract additional resources by underwriting mortgage bonds, thus giving rise
to bond trading. This should foster supply and lead to the expansion of the
housing loan market.
The State Savings Bank (SSB) functioned as a savings bank until 1999
when its legal status was changed and it became a commercial bank with
broader authority to make loans and offer additional banking products.
Still, the SSB has the largest branch network and customer base of any
bank. Its business is still oriented towards consumer loans. The ongoing
restructuring of the SSB will present a number of challenges since it lacks
expertise in risk evaluation and still has a reputation for poor customer
service.
Other financial institutions include the Agriculture State Fund which
provides financial support to agricultural producers under different pro-
grams and the state sponsored Encouragement Bank. Agriculture Fund is
also related to the accession process to the EU: it has been accredited as
the single Paying Agency in Bulgaria to manage EU SAPARD funds.
Established in 1999 by the government, the Encouragement Bank enjoys
a special status and is supposed to provide financing for small- and medium-
sized businesses. After a little more than a year of unsuccessful operation,
the Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises Law, under which the bank was
established, was amended by Parliament. The amendments have provided
for the removal of restrictions on the bankís lending operations.31
5. Conclusions
When considering the expansion of nonbank financial institutions,
there are important lessons from the early experience with commercial
31
 All state-owned banks except Biochim Commercial Bank and DSK Bank have been
privatized. Many analysts argue that the Encouragement Bank was established by the









1 banks in Bulgaria. In the early 1990s, commercial banks were not properly
regulated and this led to disastrous results.
 Since 1997, real progress has been made in creating the appropriate
legal and regulatory framework for the expansion of nonbank financial ac-
tivities. While these steps are important, it is equally important that these
new laws be enforced. Furthermore, regulatory organizations must find the
right balance between enforcement that builds confidence in these new fi-
nancial sectors, and regulation that stifles growth.
As yet, the insurance sector is the only sector that has seen significant
expansion, but pension funds should begin to grow. The development of
the capital market is less certain, but the expansion of the insurance and
pension sectors should assist the development of the capital markets by
providing a new demand for shares. An important question, however, is
whether this will be enough to create sufficient liquidity in the capital mar-
ket. If the capital markets remain illiquid, serious consideration should be
given to closing the local stock exchange and organizing or participating in
a larger regional effort.32
Nonbank financial institutions are too small to provide significant com-
petition to the banks. If these nonbank institutions are able to gain public
confidence and expand, this could create more competition for the banks
and provide more financial resources to the real sector. This could im-
prove the prospects for more sustained economic growth.
IV. Commercial Banks’ Activities
Understanding the activities of commercial banks is important for at
least two reasons. First, the principal mechanism for passing savings from
individuals to investors is through the commercial banking system. This is
Stiglitzí second required function of financial institutions in a market
economy. Since the other financial institutions still play only a limited role
in Bulgaria, the importance of commercial banks in this process of finan-
cial intermediation is great. Secondly, the banks play an important role in
determining the money supply, a key macroeconomic policy variable. The
various money supply definitions discussed in Section VI all include both
cash held by the public and deposits at commercial banks. The role of
commercial banks in the determination of the money supply is critical, as
these deposits are the liabilities of commercial banks. We begin by looking
at the items that appear on the balance sheets of commercial banks. Close
analysis of the balance sheets provides valuable insights into bank
behaviour and efficiency and provides a better understanding of the
changes in business conditions and the institutional environment in Bul-
32
 If Bulgarian companies are traded on foreign or regional markets rather than local
markets, it is still important that company law is enforced so that potential investors have












garia during the transition period. Then we consider how the commercial
banks manage their assets and liabilities.
1. Consolidated Balance Sheet of Commercial Banks
Table 4.1. shows the consolidated balance sheets of the Bulgarian com-
mercial banks in 1995 and 2000.33  The 1995 figures are indicative of the
financial conditions that existed in the 1991 ≠ 1995 pre-crisis period. The
period was characterised by dynamic changes in market share among
banks, protectionist policies favouring local and state-owned banks, weak
bank regulation and supervision, activist monetary policy, poor control
over the money supply, bad enterprise debts and rising inflation.
Table 4.1
Consolidated Balance Sheet of Commercial Banks
1995 2000
ASSETS million BGN  % million BGN %
Vault Cash and Current Accounts with the BNB 70.4 9.4 737.4 7.6
Claims on Banks and Other Financial Institutions 114.2 15.3 3,874.1 39.8
Securities in Trading Portfolio 232.7 31.2 1,065.3 10.9
Securities in Investment Portfolio 6.1 0.8 436.7 4.5
Credits to Nonfinancial Institutions and Other Clients 274.3 36.7 3,014.1 30.9
Other Assets 29.2 3.9 202.8 2.1
Fixed Assets 20.0 2.7 407.1 4.2
TOTAL ASSETS 746.9 100.0 9,737.7 100.0
of which pledged assets 470.8 63.0 527.7 5.4
LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL † † † †
Deposits by Banks and Other Financial Institutions 178.1 23.9 740.5 7.6
Deposits by Nonfinancial Institutions and Other Clients 425.3 57.0 6,393.8 65.8
TOTAL DEPOSITS 603.4 80.8 7,134.3 73.4
Other Liabilities 55.0 7.4 1,114.4 11.4
TOTAL LIABILITIES 658.4 88.2 8,248.7 84.8
Capital 59.1 7.8 1,095.4 11.2
Reserves 29.0 3.9 393.5 4.0
OWN CAPITAL (CAPITAL AND RESERVES) 88.1 11.8 1,488.9 15.2
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND OWN CAPITAL 746.5 100.0 9,737.7 100.0
OFF-BALANCE SHEET LIABILITIES 470.6 63.0 1,182.9 12.1
Source: BNB
The 2000 figures reflect the post-crisis behaviour of banks. The 1997 ≠
2000 period witnessed the stabilisation of the banking sector, accelerated
33
 The balance sheets shown in the table were prepared in compliance with the National
Accounting Standards (NAS) as they are currently applied. Over the years there have been
several amendments to NAS as well as modifications in their interpretation and implemen-
tation rules. As a result, the classification of some assets has undergone important changes.
Caution should be exercised in making data comparisons. For purposes of comparison, the
1995 consolidated balance sheet, prepared in compliance with the  applicable NAS at that









1 privatization of state-owned banks, the entry of foreign banks into the Bul-
garian financial market, passive monetary policies and low inflation under
the currency board arrangement.
We now look in more detail at the most important assets and liabilities
on the consolidated balance sheet.
1.1. Assets
Vault cash and current accounts with the BNB. This category includes
all banknotes (cash) in the bankís vaults, required reserves at the Bulgar-
ian National Bank, and transaction deposits at banks.
Banks keep cash funds to service the demands of their customers. Cash
is widely used as a means of payment in Bulgaria. As a result the level of
cash held by banks needs to be higher than in other countries where other
means of payment are more common.
By law, commercial banks must meet required minimum reserve re-
quirements established by the BNB. Under Article 41 para. 1 of the Law
on the BNB ëthe BNB shall lay down certain minimum reserve require-
ments commercial banks are required to meet, the methodology of calcu-
lation as well as the terms and conditions of paying interest on them.í At
first (1991) the required minimal reserves were 7% of the total attracted
deposits, but this ratio was raised in a series of steps during 1994 and 1995
until it reached a record high of 12% in April 1995. Later the requirement
was stepped down to 8.5% as the BNB attempted in increase the amount
of money outstanding. In the post-crisis period, the ratio was raised to
11% to maintain stability in the system. In mid-2000 it has been lowered to
8% as the performance of Bulgarian banks improved.
The BNB is allowed to set the interest rate on the minimum required
reserves of commercial banks. Before August 1994, no interest was paid on
these reserves. Between 1994 and 1999, the interest rate varied depending
on economic conditions. In mid-1996 the interest rate was 36% as the
BNB attempted to alleviate liquidity problems in the commercial banks.
Currently, no interest is paid on minimum required reserves.
If banks provide services to customers holding foreign currency deposits,
part of the reserves with the BNB may be kept in foreign currency.
 34
Required reserves at the BNB are also used as settlement accounts, i.e.
34
 When the BNB  introduced minimum reserve requirements in 1990, commercial banks
were allowed to use foreign currency deposits to meet reserve requirements. The ratio of
foreign currency reserves to lev reserves had to correspond to the ratio between the foreign
currency liabilities and lev liabilities. This element of the monetary policy underwent a num-
ber of changes. There was a decision to remove foreign currency reserves by end-1993. At
a later stage foreign currency reserves were once again introduced. In 1994, the relative
share of foreign exchange reserves changed several times. Thus for instance in August 1994
alone monetary policies underwent two modifications (BNB, Monthly Bulletin, No. 8, pp.
42-43). Frequent amendments impeded bank planning and assets management. Presently,
commercial banks can keep their reserves in foreign currency, but the ratio of foreign cur-












clearing accounts.35 When one enterprise makes a payment in levs to an-
other enterprise and they are customers of different banks, the transfer of
funds is cleared through accounts the commercial banks have at the BNB.36
The clearing system through the Central Bank is only applied to trans-
actions in levs. Foreign currency transactions are settled by commercial
banks themselves and to make settlements easier banks are required to
hold foreign currency accounts with other banks. 37
Claims on banks and other financial institutions. In this general category
there are two types of claims: deposits at other banks and financial institu-
tions, and loans to other banks and financial institutions. At the end of
2000, claims on banks and other financial institutions accounted for 39.8%
of total bank assets, more than 2.5 times increase from 1995.
The percentage of claims on banks and other financial institutions has
been relatively high in Bulgaria (when compared with international stan-
dards.) The reasons behind the high shares in 1995 and 1999 were radi-
cally different, however. In 1995 the high share was due to lending to
emerging private banks and the special role of the State Savings Bank
(SSB). State banks often loaned money to friends at emerging private
banks. Also in 1995 the SSB was the largest deposit-taker. Other banks
mostly borrowed from the SSB through the interbank money market.
By 2000 the picture was completely different. The banking system was
largely privatized by foreign banks. Other banks besides SSB became also
important deposit takers and did not have to borrow as much on the inter-
bank money markets. Private banks were much less willing to loan to risky
new emerging banks. Indeed banks were very conservative in their lending
practices. Because there were still problems associated with lending to the
real sector, banks began to rechannel a large portion of their money
abroad, mostly as deposits to their mother companies. As a result, the rela-
tive share of these assets grew significantly.
Securities in trading portfolio and securities in investment portfolio. This
item covers shares, bonds, other securities and transferable claims. These
may be short-term instruments with maturities less than one year or long-
term securities with maturities greater than one year. Short-term securities
are used for hedging or speculation. Long-term securities not only pay in-
terest and dividends they also provide the possibility of exercising control
over other banks.38
35
 During part of the reviewed period commercial banks kept separate accounts with
the BNB for required reserves and clearing transactions.  This practice was abandoned
in 1998.
36 For more details see Section VII.
37 Over the years several suggestions have been made to clear foreign currency transac-
tions through the BNB. (BNB Regulation BUS 1092, Settlement in BNB, p. 2.1; 2.2.6).
38 Banks are restricted to buy equity in companies other than banks. The total amount
of bankís investments in real estate, tangible fixed assets and equity shall not exeed bankís









1 Due to the limited range of financial instruments in the underdevel-
oped capital market, banks hold mainly government securities. Indeed,
close to 80% of outstanding government securities are held by banks.
There are two types of government securities: securities issued for budget
financing purposes and special-purpose securities. The bulk of special-pur-
pose securities were issued under the Law on Settlement of
Nonperforming Credits (ZUNK). These bonds were issued to cover the
bad debts of state-owned enterprises.39
Between 1995 and 2000 the ratio of securities to total bank assets de-
clined from 32.0% to 15.4%. The decline was entirely due to the lower
volume of government securities issues as the overall government budget
stabilized.
Credits to nonfinancial institutions and other customers. This category
includes loans extended to both corporate and individual customers. Inter-
est rates on these loans are freely negotiable between the lending bank and
the borrower. One of the most important functions of commercial banking
is lending to support the operations of companies. Legally, banks may ex-
tend loans in levs or foreign currency. More than half of corporate loans
(between 50% and 60%) are in foreign currency.
Housing loans are the most important type of loans to individuals.
Housing loans are normally extended by the SSB, which has traditionally
provided services to this segment of the market. Recently three other
banks, besides SSB, have begun offering mortgage loans.
The relative share of credits to nonfinancial institutions and other cus-
tomers within total bank assets decreased in the post-crisis period from
36.7% in 1995 to 30.9% at the end of 2000. This compares with ratios of
50% ≠ 60% in well-developed banking systems.
Several factors contribute to the low level of lending activity in Bul-
garia. Banks are trying to avoid past mistakes made during the 1996 ≠ 1997
crisis. In addition there are new legal requirements to provision for bad
loans and stricter bank supervision. Risk associated with lending in the
real sector is still high and is reflected in the large spreads between deposit
and lending rates. On the other hand, some institutional changes are low-
ering risks. A public registry of collateral has made lending more secure.
Other assets and fixed assets: In addition to the income-bearing assets
described above there are other assets that are not immediately income-
bearing. Also there are fixed assets that help to support bank operations. It
is noteworthy that banks are not allowed to invest in real estate, equip-
ment and equity (with the exception of equity in other banks) that exceeds
their own capital. This restriction has important implications for the role
of banks in the management of companies in the real sector. It means that
39













Bulgarian banks cannot play a role similar to German or Japanese banks
which support, direct and help govern companies in the real sector.
1.2. Liabilities
Deposits of banks and other financial institutions. Commercial banks
can borrow funds from other commercial banks, nonbanking financial in-
stitutions or from the BNB. In the early 1990s banks often deposited funds
in other commercial banks. This was mostly state-owned banks placing
deposits in private banks. As part of its monetary policy, the BNB also
placed deposits in commercial banks. These deposits were unsecured loans
being made by the BNB to commercial banks. The amount of these BNB
deposits grew dramatically in the last two years before the crisis.
In the post-crisis period, the privatization of banks, amendments to
bank legislation, and tough restrictions on the BNB under the currency
board arrangement have caused the level of these deposits to fall from
23.9% of total bank liabilities in 1995 to 7.6% in 2000.
Deposits of nonfinancial institutions and other clients. This item includes
all current accounts and savings and time deposits of individuals, compa-
nies and organisations in both levs and foreign currency. Since the SSB
was the only bank used by individuals before the transition, the majority of
these accounts were still at the SSB during 1990s. Over time, however,
with banks expanding their activities and establishing regional branches,
there has been a progressive movement away from the SSB as other banks
compete for these funds. The relative share of funds attracted from nonfi-
nancial institutions within total liabilities had followed a steady upward
trend, reaching 65.8% in 2000 versus 57.0% in 1995. This increase is an
indication of the growing competition among banks in attracting funds
from primary depositors.
Other Liabilities. This category includes loans from other banks, inter-
est payments due on these loans as well as other liabilities and deferred ex-
penditures.
Banks can borrow from other commercial banks through the interbank
money market, or from the BNB. Funds borrowed from other banks are
recorded here. Deposits of commercial banks or the BNB are entered un-
der ëdeposits of banks and other financial institutionsí. At the outset of the
bank reforms in Bulgaria, interbank auctions were used as the major
mechanism for transferring funds to banks. At a later stage, the BNB
switched to other forms of collateralised bank lending such as Lombard
credits. Any form of commercial bank refinancing, lending included, by
the BNB has stopped with the establishment of the currency board.
A comparison between 2000 and 1995 data shows that the share of
other liabilities has increased from 7.4% to 11.4%. Although BNB refi-









1 Own capital. This item covers the equity capital of banks and includes
authorized capital, profit and reserves. Authorised capital is determined by
the nominal value of shares in the bank. The current banking legislation
requires that banksí authorized capital should be at least BGN 10 million.
Own capital also includes operating profit in the current financial year
and undistributed profit, if any, from past years. The relative share of capi-
tal, the combination of authorized capital and profits, in total liabilities
rose from 7.8% in 1995 to 11.2% in 2000. This is due to both rising profits
and higher capital requirements.
There are two types of reserves: legal provisions for bad loans and re-
serve funds. Under the Law on Banks, banks must set aside provisions for
bad loans from their pre-tax profits. The BNB regulates the classification
of credits and provisions against them. If delinquencies are expected,
banks must reduce their dividends and create a pool of reserve funds to
meet any future loss. Under Article 24 of the Law on Banks, banks must
set aside at least one-fifth of their post-tax profit for a reserve fund until
the reserve fund reaches 1.25% of total assets. Amounts above these levels
can be paid out in dividents. In accordance with the Basle arrangements,
BNB regulations state that the capital base must be at least 12% of the risk
component of banksí assets.40
2. Issues of Asset Management
In managing their asset portfolios private banks pursue three often
contradictory objectives: profitability, liquidity, and solvency. For banks to
be liquid they must hold assets that are easily converted into transferable
assets. To ensure solvency the banks must be cautious about the riskiness
of loans. To be profitable, they must put financial resources to work, seek-
ing the highest yields on assets. But none of these can be pursued indepen-
dently of the others. High yields can mean not only higher profits but also
greater risk of insolvency. Liquidity can be at the expense of profitability
as money sits idle. When banks manage their assets, they are pursuing
strategies that will fulfill each objective without seriously impairing the
others.
There are several features of the Bulgarian financial environment
which further complicate the already difficult task of bank asset manage-
ment. We shall focus on four major issues: the paucity of secondary mar-
kets in most assets, high risk, the burden of bad loans of SOEs, and the
need to finance the emerging private sector. Each impacts liquidity, sol-
vency or profitability of Bulgarian commercial banks.
40
 The Basle arrangements provide for different risk categories and capital adequacy
requirements vary for the different categories. The precise definition of capital base and
the risk component of the assets is given in Regulation No. 8 of the BNB. Since 1997 the
average capital adequacy ratio of the banks has been far above the requirement with ra-












Bad debts. One aspect of the reform of the banking system was the dis-
tribution of loans or credits of SOEs to the newly formed commercial
banks. The unfortunate legacy of these state enterprise loans created a se-
vere challenge for the banking system. The ëoriginal loansí to many SOEs
were not really loans in the normal sense at all. The money was extended
under the previous system of central planning where the risks of default on
repayment were not evaluated. Once these loans appeared on the accounts
of the newly established commercial banks, they became assets of these
banks. As bank assets, the loans had value only if they were repaid. Unfor-
tunately, many SOEs were suffering from severe financial problems, espe-
cially following the collapse of the CMEA markets, and were therefore not
able to repay these loans. They could not simply be written off as the
banks holding them would be seriously threatened with insolvency.
These problems were exacerbated by two other problems. The first was
high interest rates. When prices were freed in February 1991, nominal in-
terest rates rose sharply to reflect the high inflation. Even SOEs that might
have been able to repay existing loans were faced with high interest pay-
ments on the loans. The banks were fearful that if the loans went into de-
fault, they might be threatened with bankruptcy themselves. The banks,
therefore, did not want to declare the loans to be in default.
The second problem was that many of these enterprise loans were in
convertible currency. Bulgaria borrowed large sums of money from for-
eign banks in the late 1980ís. Even though the central planning system de-
termined how the money would be spent, it was recorded in the banking
system as if these were convertible currency loans being made by the cen-
tral bank to enterprises. When the banking system was reorganized, these
became real loans which the enterprises were now obligated to repay. If
these loans had been denominated in levs, the high inflation in 1991 would
have greatly reduced their real value, but the sharp depreciation of the lev
more than offset this effect.41
As time passed the problem became worse because enterprises paid
neither the interest nor the principal on these loans. During the 1991 ≠
1996 period there was also government complicity in all of this. The gov-
ernment feared high unemployment and social unrest. SOEs were in bad
financial difficulty, but they were still functioning at some level. If the bad
debts forced liquidation of SOEs, unemployment would rise even higher.
The banks understood this and recognized that the government would bail
them out if state enterprise loans were not repaid.42 Thus the banks knew
41
 Inflation reduces the problem of repaying a fixed loan. If the value of a loan was
fixed at BGL 500,000, it would have been much easier to repay it after prices had in-
creased five fold in 1991. When the loans were denominated in dollar amounts, however,
the BGL 500,000 loan became a BGL 5,000,000 loan. See Dobrinsky (1994) for a more
complete explanation of these problems.
42 Ironically enough there were cases when the Minister of Industry issued official ordi-









1 the risks associated with extending further credits to the SOEs.
Government protection created an atmosphere where there was little
incentive to improve efficiency. Management of companies was poor and
in many instances managers just siphoned off profits into their own pock-
ets. More bad debts were generated by commercial banks themselves.
Weak regulation and poor supervision created an atmosphere where the
criteria for new loans was side payments to bank officials rather than
evaluation of actual risks. This created more loans that were never repaid.
All this led to the adoption of the ZUNK Law at the end of 1993. Un-
der this law, ZUNK (government) bonds were substituted for bad loans to
SOEs on bank balance sheets. By removing the bad debt from the balance
sheet of the commercial banks, it was hoped that the financial condition of
both the banks and the SOEs will improve. Unfortunately, the results fell
well short of expectations. Even after a grace period, most debt was never
repaid to the government. Soon the government was faced with the same
dilemma as before: launch bankruptcy procedures against the debtors and
trigger a chain of enterprises failures and higher unemployment or write
off even more debt and let the problems in the SOEs continue to fester.
High risk. Lending to SOEs throughout this period was very risky. On
top of the usual business risks, a number of transition-specific circum-
stances made it difficult to anticipate future problems. Sweeping institu-
tional changes, radical shifts in the governmentís economic and trade poli-
cies, political pressure on state-run enterprises, insecure markets, the
short-term horizon of management teams, all contributed to these prob-
lems in the pre-crisis period. In the post-crisis period, the macroeconomic
situation stabilized, but the fast pace of privatization created new uncer-
tainties. Enterprise restructuring and privatization by management-em-
ployee-buy-outs (MEBOs), sometimes with ëbehind the sceneí investors
are sources of greater risk for creditors. As a result banks are still making
few loans to the real sector of the economy. In an effort to place their
funds in less risky assets they are investing a substantial part of their port-
folio in foreign bonds. It is estimated that in 2000, banks had approxi-
mately USD 1.5 billion invested abroad. This means that a substantial part
of the savings accumulated by Bulgarian citizens in Bulgarian banks is not
being invested in the Bulgarian economy.43
Secondary markets: The paucity of secondary markets in most financial
assets limits the strategies that Bulgarian commercial banks can pursue to
maintain liquidity. Secondary markets are valuable to banks because these
markets make it possible for banks to manage unanticipated or extraordi-
nary needs for cash. At the beginning of the transition, the only liquid as-
sets were cash and deposits at the BNB. Banks could also acquire cash by
43
 The impact on the economy of this outflow of funds is offset by the inflow of foreign
investment in Bulgaria. The improved stability of the Bulgarian economy in the post-cri-












borrowing from other banks in the interbank money market. With the
opening of secondary markets in government securities in January 1993,
banks were able to hold these securities and sell them when they needed
extra funds. The emergence of the stock market in late 1997 made it pos-
sible for banks to maintain portfolios of corporate and municipal securities
as well, but the sluggish development of this market and the low liquidity
of most assets limits its usefulness.
Throughout the 1990s the government securities market improved
steadily. By 1997, the BNB was pursuing an active monetary policy and
trading heavily in repos.44  Under the currency board arrangement the
BNB is not allowed to trade in the government securities market and the
liquidity of government bonds has decreased. The market in government
securities is rather narrow and cannot be compared with stock markets or
government security markets in the US, for instance, where tremendous
volume of bonds are traded on a daily basis.
The low return on government securities since the financial crisis
ended in Bulgaria has been another problem for banks. Small government
budget deficits has reduced the flow of new government securities. Banks
have been reluctant to lend to the real sector, increasing the demand for
government securities. Smaller supply of bonds and higher demand for
bonds has reduced nominal interest rates. Real interest rates have even
been negative at times.
Improvements in these markets should be possible. The Ministry of Fi-
nance could become a market-maker in the government security market,
thereby increasing liquidity and stabilizing prices in the secondary mar-
kets. Presently the Ministry provides some services for individuals, but
these are for specific purposes and are a tiny part of the market. Another
possibility would be to develop a resale market in loans. An extensive re-
sale market in mortgage loans exists in the US, for example. Currently this
market cannot develop in Bulgaria because bank secrecy regulations in the
Law on Banks limit the dissemination of information to potential buyers of
loans. Careful amendment to the Law would open opportunities for devel-
oping such a market. Then banks could manage their assets better.
Lending to the private sector: The principal function of commercial
banks should be to make loans to the business community. However, loans
to the private sector have been limited so far. In the pre-crisis period,
banks preferred to loan to the SOEs, private sector loans were only 12.4%
of total credit in 1993 and 13.9% in 1994. This compares with 50% and
45% to the government sector and 37% and 41% to SOEs. Given that the
44
 When the BNB sold government securities to banks, a repurchase agreement (repo)
was usually part of the contract. Under the repurchase agreement, the BNB would agree
to repurchase these securities at a specified time and at an agreed price within a short pe-
riod of time. This would make the security more liquid from the point of view of bank









1 private sector was somewhere between one-quarter to one-third of the
economy at that time, there was a clear bias towards lending to the public
rather than the private sector.45 As late as 1996 there had been little
change, private-sector loans were 20.7% (private sector share 40% of the
economy) while loans to SOEs and the government were 14.8% and
64.4%, respectively. Throughout this period the banking sector was domi-
nated by state-run banks and new emerging private banks sought out large
SOEs to gain market share.
In the post-crisis period, bank lending shifted dramatically. By
2000, government loans were only 10.5% of total domestic credit and
SOEs loans 9.1%; private sector loans ballooned to 80.4% of total domes-
tic credit (67% claims on private enterprises and 13% claims on public) as
the importance of the private sector expanded to 69.3% of the economy.
While the private sector share of loans has grown, the overall volume of
loans has decreased so much that the actual level of private sector credit
has increased for four years by only 20% in dollar terms (USD 1,599 mil-
lion in 2000 vs. USD 1,327 in 1996). If improvements are measured in
terms of credit extended to the private sector, private sector loans are still
low relative to other transition economies. Even Belarus had a higher per-
centage of loans to the private sector. While private sector loans in Bul-
garia are about 12% of GDP, in the Czech Republic it is more than 60%.
(EBRD, Transition Report, 1999, p. 94)
There are several reasons why the financial system has failed to suc-
cessfully transfer funds from savers to investors in this new economic situ-
ation. First, as mentioned above, there is great risk in the private sector.
The economy has been going through enormous change. Future develop-
ments are difficult to predict. Most prospective business people and most
bank personnel are very inexperienced. Furthermore, bank personnel and
business people were not always driven by the proper incentives to help
their organizations prosper. All these factors increase the likelihood that
mistakes will be made and increase the riskiness of loans. The result is that
the most productive projects do not necessarily receive the most support,
and loans are not effectively monitored (Stiglitzí points 4 and 5).46
Secondly, there is a differential in the risk that banks incur when they
loan to the private sector. As the ZUNK Law demonstrated, there is some
probability that the government will protect the banks when loans to SOEs
go into default. There is no similar guarantee for loans to the private sector.
Third, the laws regarding the bankís right to seize collateralized assets
in the event of default are still cumbersome. This is part of the more gen-
45
 The data provided draw upon BNBís Annual Reports in the relevant year. Due to ac-
counting problems during this period, these figures probably understate the relative size
of the private sector.
46 For a more detailed discussion of the problems of making loans in an economy in












eral problem of relatively weak legal protection of lenders. Without such
protection, banks cannot use collateral to protect against future risk.47  De-
spite the fact that the Bankruptcy Law has been in place for some time,
there are still obstacles and impediments in its implementation. Court pro-
cedures are slow and inefficient, and debtors can throw up many barriers,
which further prolong the process.
Even with these problems, banks remain the main source for financing
private activity. Presently, much small-scale business is self-financed. To
help the private sector grow two serious problems must be addressed: (1)
lack of incentives for banks to lend money to the private sector, and (2)
resolving information related problems in an uncertain environment. From
1998 to 2000 a large part of the Bulgarian banking sector was privatized by
foreign banks. This may prove to be helpful. Foreign banks can bring in
valuable experience in risk evaluation and marketing. This may help banks
build longer-term relationships with their customers. In the process this
can breakdown some of the information barriers that presently exist.
Backed by the stability and experience of their new institutions, bank offic-
ers should be able to evaluate private-sector needs and risks. At the same
time private enterprises should be prepared to submit realistic business
plans and information. These changes should improve overall lending
practices.
3. Issues of Liabilities Management
The liability side of the balance sheet describes how bankers acquire
funds that can be loaned out. Banks prefer to acquire funds, which require
low interest payments and remain in the bank for long periods of time.
Commercial bankers are far from powerless in managing the liabilities side
of the balance sheet. By varying the interest rates they pay and the types of
deposits they offer, banks can influence the deposits they receive. Further-
more, banks can obtain funds by borrowing money from other banks or
the central bank (if the central bank acts as a ëlender of last resortí).
In most countries deposits are a significant share of bank liabilities. To
attract deposits customers must have confidence in the bank. In many
countries, bank deposits are insured by some form of guarantee. If a bank
fails, its customer deposits are protected.
In Bulgaria, the Deposit Insurance Fund protects depositors.48  Prior to
its establishment, the only bank providing explicit deposit guarantee was
the SSB. This gave a comparative advantage to Bulgariaís biggest deposit-
taker, but few customers were aware of the important difference between
47
 As risk is very difficult to evaluate in the extraordinary conditions of a transition to a
market economy, banks are heavily reliant on collateral as a way to provide security
against risk even though they are aware that acquiring the collateralized assets after de-
fault will be a long and painstaking exercise.









1 the SSB and the other banks. Most people believed that the government
was responsible for all money deposited with banks, be they state-run or
private. These expectations were later confirmed when the first bankruptcy
(Jambol Bank) occurred and the government protected depositors. Later,
the governments stepped in again during the financial crisis and protected
depositors when seventeen commercial banks failed. No distinction was
made between state-run and private banks.
The dimensions of the problem of implicit guarantees became clear as
the financial crisis unfolded. Either explicit guarantees were needed or
there should be no guarantees at all.49  The problem was resolved by estab-
lishing the DIF. The DIF insures all depositors up to a certain limit. Com-
mercial banks pay insurance premiums into the Fund that are used when
banks fail. With the transformation of the SSB into a commercial bank
(i. e. abolishing its special status of a savings institution), the SSB no
longer enjoys a special status and now all banks have the same deposit
guarantee.
Building confidence in financial institutions is important if funds are to
be transferred from savers to investors. During the early transition when
most banks were state-owned, their viability was not seriously questioned.
This confidence was completely shattered during the crisis. In the post-cri-
sis period, restoring confidence has become a top priority. Some progress
has been made, but it is slow. Funds attracted from nonfinancial enter-
prises and other customers rose 16.8% between 1997 and 2000 while
nominal GDP rose 49.2% over the same period. Public opinion polls have
shown that confidence, four years after the crisis, is still far from being
fully restored.50
If people had greater awareness and understanding of the deposit in-
surance provided by the DIF, this would probabily increase confidence in
the banking system. Raising the deposit limit above current BGN 6,900
would also help. To protect the DIF the banks must be properly
supervized so that any abuse of deposit insurance is avoided, and govern-
ment guarantees should be made explicit and enforced. Without strict su-
pervision, deposit insurance is like a time bomb that could trigger another
financial crisis.
Beyond deposits another important bank liability during the pre-crisis
period was refinancing provided by the BNB. Central banks in developed
49
 Bulgaria was not alone in facing such problems. The dangers of associated with de-
posit insurance were clearly visible from the events that took place in the US economy in
the 1980ís when deposit insurance helped destabilize the savings and loan banks. (See
Mishkin, pp. 254 ≠ 256). On the other hand, deposit insurance had provided stability to
the US banking system for more than 40 years after the Great Depression.
50 Asked about their confidence in the banking system over the last few years 7% of
those responding said they had never lost confidence; 35% said that their confidence had
been restored and 55% answered that their confidence had not been restored. See ëThe












market economies often use refinancing to provide additional funds to
banks. In the pre-crisis period, refinancing by the BNB in various forms
was a significant source of funds for commercial banks. Unfortunately, re-
financing lead to high unsustainable money supply growth. Loss of control
over the money supply was an important contributor to the crisis. BNB re-
financing was suspended when the currency board was established.
The interbank market is another credit market. This market provides a
mechanism where banks can lend funds they do not need on a short-term
basis to other banks. The establishment of the interbank money market in
1991 improved the efficiency of the banking system and made it possible
for funds to be rechannelled to banks that could make better use of them.
The interest rate varies with supply and demand for funds.51  Higher inter-
est rates are an indication of more restrictive lending conditions in the
economy as a whole and result from fierce competition among banks to
attract scarce financial resources.
4. Efficiency of the Bulgarian Banking System
Because it is difficult to define exactly what product banks produce, it
is hard to identify a single indicator of overall banking efficiency. Table
4.2. presents information on three common indicators of bank efficiency:
(1) return on assets, (2) return on equity and (3) leverage. The data has
been drawn from the consolidated balance sheets and the income state-
ments of two groups: (a) large banks and (b) small and medium-sized
banks.52
As shown in the table, ROA in the banking system as a whole over the
period surveyed varied between -0.3% and 5.0% whereas ROE ranged
from -3.7% to 115.5%. The high values for ROE in 1996 and 1997 was
due to hyperinflation. High interest rates for these years led to high nomi-
nal returns. ROA values did not rise because the nominal value of the as-
sets also rose with inflation. On the hand, capital was not revalued along
with inflation, so higher nominal interest income raised the ROE ratio.
Profits created by inflation were taxed as a normal corporate profit at the
same time that banks were losing business in the crisis. Post-tax returns
were significantly lower than the inflation rate, which decapitalized the
banks in real terms.
51
 See Petrov (2000) for an in-depth analysis of the supply and demand for bank re-
serves in the interbank market during the 1998 ≠ 2000 period.
52 This grouping draws upon BNBís classification system that was applied until 1998. In
1999 the BNB introduced a more detailed classification into five bank groups. To make
comparisons easier the authors have aggregated 1999 and 2000 data into two groups. The












Large Banks Small and Total Inflation
Medium Banks (CPI,%)
1995 ROA (%) -0,1 -1,3 -0,3
ROE (%) -2,6 -6,7 -3,7 32,9
Leverage 16,2 4,1 12,8
1996 ROA 3,3 2,0 3,2
ROE 86,2 13,2 65,2 310,8
Leverage 25,0 5,8 19,5
1997 ROA 6,8 -0,6 5,0
ROE 303,1 -6,0 115,5 578,0
Leverage 43,7 8,3 22,2
1998 ROA 2,0 0,9 1,7
ROE 36,5 6,9 21,5 1,0
Leverage 17,0 6,4 11,7
1999 ROA 3,0 1,4 2,5
ROE 30,2 10,5 23,1 6,2
Leverage 9,0 6,6 8,2
2000 ROA 3,7 0,6 2,8
ROE 34,3 5,1 25,0 11,4
Leverage 8,3 7,0 7,9
Source: BNB, Banks’ Annual Reports.
Following the crisis, inflation was low as the macroeconomic situation
stabilized. Banks reported positive real ROE, i. e. higher than inflation.53
Large banks reported higher efficiency ratios than small and medium-size
banks throughout the period. Sometimes the ROA and ROE values for
large banks were several times larger than the ratios for small and medium-
size banks. Even in ëhyperinflationaryí 1997, small and medium banks expe-
rienced losses while large banks registered profits. The higher efficiency of
large banks is not surprising given the economies of scale in banking. Also,
large banks reported a higher leverage indicating that they were able to at-
tract more money per unit of capital. Until 1998 the funds, borrowed by
large banks per unit of capital was 3 to 4 times higher than small and me-
dium-size banks. After that the difference is not so significant as a result of
increased competition but still remains in favour of large banks.
This supports the contention of some analysts that there are too many
banks in Bulgaria. Many banks are too small and inefficient. While further
53 
Comparisons in a dynamic perspective should be cautiously handled, for the inflation
rate in the different years followed a largely different dynamics. The period also wit-
nessed sweeping and all-embracing institutional reforms, constant changes in bank ac-
counting and the accounting practices of individual banks, changes in the capital struc-













consolidation can be encouraged by government policy, the long-term sta-
bility of the banking would be enhanced if further consolidation is left to
the market.
5. The Role of Commercial Banks
Commercial banks perform two important functions in the Bulgarian
economy. First, deposits of the banks are part of the money supply. Sec-
ondly, banks are financial intermediaries, which pass funds from savers to
investors. Until other financial institutions develop, banks will have tre-
mendous influence on future investment in Bulgaria and the development
of the Bulgarian economy. Important improvements in the banking system
have been made since the transition to a market economy began, but there
are still very serious problems, which must be solved. We have noted the
ways in which the current financial system is unable to meet many of
Stiglitzís requirements for a market economy. Because the key to future
economic prosperity lies with rational investment decisions, further devel-
opment of the banking system have a significant impact on the growth
path of the Bulgarian economy.
V. The Bulgarian National Bank
The Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) has a central role in the financial
system. During the early 1990s the BNB underwent major reform. In June
1991 the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank was passed. This law pro-
vided a legal basis for the BNB to function in a market economy. Under
this law the BNB functioned as a traditional central bank with discretion
to carry out monetary policy. This changed dramatically with the introduc-
tion of the currency board in July 1997. A new Law on the BNB was
passed. Under this new law, the power of the BNB to influence monetary
policy is much more limited.
This section will look at the responsibilities of the BNB and compare
and contrast its present organization with the structure of the BNB when it
was a more traditional central bank in the early 1990s. First, however, we
will outline the basic responsibilities of the BNB and describe its basic or-
ganizational structure. As we will see, the responsibilities and goals of the
BNB have not changed very much, but under the currency board arrange-
ment the methods used to achieve these goals have changed radically.
1. The Responsibilities of the Central Bank
Presently, the role of the Bulgarian National Bank is limited to central













1 (1) The main task of the Bulgarian National Bank shall be to contrib-
ute to the maintenance of the stability of the national currency through
implementation of monetary and credit policy and to assist in the estab-
lishment and maintenance of efficient payment mechanisms.
(2) The Bulgarian National Bank shall have the exclusive right of issu-
ing banknotes in this country.
(3) The Bulgarian National Bank shall regulate and supervise other
banksí activities in this country for the purpose of ensuring the stability of
the banking system and protecting depositors.
 Maintaining a Stable Currency: In the first statement, the BNB is given
its most important and most difficult charge. Because the sections which
follow will discuss in detail the mechanisms used by the central bank to
manage the money supply and to clear and collect payments, our com-
ments here will be brief. It is useful, however, to highlight at this point the
emphasis given in the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank on the mainte-
nance of stability. Stability means both internal and external stability.
These are related but independent tasks. They are the prerequisite for
Stiglitzí first function, management of the medium of exchange, that must
be performed by financial institutions in a market economy.
Internal stability is typically achieved when inflation is controlled
by manipulation of credit and the money supply and when the currency is
accepted as the medium-of-exchange. In a move to support the lev as the
internal medium of exchange, the Council of Ministers passed in February
1991 Ordinance No. 15, which prohibited the use of foreign currency in
internal transactions.55  More important to the viability of the lev for inter-
nal transactions, however, has been the smooth functioning of the foreign
exchange markets. This eliminated the incentive to transact in foreign cur-
rencies. In the early 1990s the lev quickly became accepted in spite of the
high inflation that ensued. This was a major accomplishment during the
early years of the transition.
External stability depends on the establishment of foreign exchange
rate convertibility. During the early phases of the transition, this was a
major objective of the central bank. Here also the bank met with consider-
able early success, but this was not sustainable. When prices were released
in February 1991, the convertibility of the lev was established for many
types of transactions. During 1991 the floating exchange rate fluctuated
between 15 and 22 levs per dollar. From early 1992 until the autumn of
1994 the fluctuations of the lev were moderate and its nominal value fell
from 22 to about 26 levs per dollar. In the spring of 1994 the first sharp
adjustment in the lev occurred. By the summer of 1994 the exchange rate
was 54 lev per dollar, less than half the value of a year earlier.
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Over the next two years the lev depreciated further in fits and starts
and fell to 74 levs to the dollar by the spring of 1996. At this point a real fi-
nancial crisis erupted. At one point in early 1997 the exchange rate was
over 3,000 levs to the dollar before falling back into the range of 1,800 levs
to the dollar.56  The failure to maintain external stability was a major rea-
son for the reform of the BNB and the establishment of the currency
board.
Issuing Currency: The second statement requires the central bank to
decide on the issuance and withdrawal of banknotes. By the end of 2000
there were more than 2 billion levs in banknotes in circulation.
As this mandate is discussed, bear in mind the distinction between
money and currency. The money supply includes both currency and other
liquid funds. Attention is often directed at the money supply when analyz-
ing national macroeconomic objectives such as limiting inflation, main-
taining stable foreign exchange rates and spurring economic growth. In is-
suing currency, the BNBís objective is more limited. Decisions can be
guided by public preferences, as to both quantity and denomination of
banknotes and coins so long as the central bank controls the overall quan-
tity of money and credit.
The rapid inflation during the transition years has prompted many
changes in the banknotes used by the public. As prices rose small notes
were no longer adequate and larger notes were introduced. In 1999 a
redenomination occurred and the new lev was introduced. Each new lev is
equal to 1,000 old levs. This created a need to change all the banknotes. It
also led to the reintroduction of stotinka coins. These coins had become
practically worthless during the inflationary period of the 1990s.
The redenomination of the lev did not have any significant economic
impact. It did not change the real value of the money supply. The purpose
was to make it easier for people to use the lev. Prices can now be stated in
smaller numbers. This makes it easier to use the money.57  The
redenomination also made it easier to compare the lev to the Deutsche-
mark since the exchange rate became one Deutschemark to one lev.
In addition to these changes in the demand for banknotes, there are
times when a need develops for relatively more currency and relatively
fewer bank deposits. The BNB can respond to these seasonal needs by ex-
panding the amount of banknotes in circulation. These peaks may corre-
spond to the publicís increased needs for currency during holiday periods.
56
 The exchange rates describing the movements of the lev were the actual exchange
rates during this period. Since that time there has been a redenomination of the lev. 1,000
old (nonredenominated) levs is now equal to 1 new (redenominated) lev.
57 Monetary units can be very unwieldy. In spite of very high inflation Turkey has not
chosen to redenominate its currency. Bus tickets can be 200,000 lira. A car can cost









1 Commercial Bank Regulation: Finally, to the BNB has also been given
responsibility as the Stateís regulator of commercial banks. Throughout
the world, governments typically set rules and monitor the performance of
banks to a much greater extent than they do other businesses. Underlying
this caution is first the fact that banks operate primarily with other
peopleís money. Depositors who place their money in banks require pro-
tection against mismanagement of their funds. Secondly, given the central
role of commercial banks in the allocation of financial resources, the dis-
turbing effects of bank failure can resound throughout the economy as
happened during the financial crisis of 1996 ≠ 1997.
Central banks need not be supervision agencies. Indeed the alternative
of an independent supervision agency outside of the BNB was considered,
but because of the limited number of skilled bank staff and the possibility
of overlapping control issues, a decision was made to keep supervision
within the BNB (Stratev, 1992).
In the massive changes that took place during the early 1990s, bank su-
pervision did not receive very high priority. Supervisory staff were not well
trained, and the accounting systems were deficient. It was not until June
1995 that better accounting requirements were finally put into place. It was
then that the severe problems in the banking system became more obvi-
ous. Regulators were not able to solve these problems before they ex-
ploded on the economy in the financial crisis in 1996.
The broad outline of the BNBís regulatory responsibilities regarding
commercial banks are found in the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank.
At the beginning of the transition these general obligations were further
elaborated in the Law on Banks and Credit Activity (1992). This latter law
specified the power of the BNB to grant and revoke licenses for conduct-
ing banking operations. It also provided for both off-site and on-site in-
spections of commercial banks.
The inadequacies of the Law on Banks and Credit Activity became ob-
vious as time passed. In June 1997 along with the establishment of the cur-
rency board a new ëLaw on Banksí was passed. This new law expanded the
supervisory authority of the BNB. In particular it made it easier for the
BNB to close failing banks. Under the earlier law, court delays made it dif-
ficult for BNB to take control of banks before they were stripped of their
assets.
The new law is a considerable improvement over the old law, but prob-
lems still remain. Once bankruptcy is declared, the courts control the pro-
cess and the BNB has only a secondary role. This has not been totally sat-
isfactory so there have been proposals to amend the law to give the super-
vision department more input into the process of selling off assets and pay-
ing off creditors as part of the bankruptcy procedures.
Other amendments to the 1997 banking law were also made during the












forts by the BNB to bring Bulgarian law into conformity with EU direc-
tives and IMF proposals. There is also an increasing understanding that
passing new laws is not sufficient. It is important that the new laws be en-
forced.
2. BNB Organization
When the currency board was established in 1997, the BNB was reor-
ganized to reflect its new function. The BNB is administered by a Gover-
nor and a Managing Board. The Managing Board has seven members: the
Governor, three Deputy Governors and three additional members who do
not work in another capacity at the BNB or in the banking sector. The
Governor and the Deputy Governors are elected by the National Assem-
bly to six-year terms. The three outside members of the Managing Board
are appointed by the President also to six-year terms. All major policy and
regulatory decisions must be adopted by the Board. To protect the BNB
from political influence, the Law on the BNB specifically states that Board
members can be dismissed only when there is dereliction of duty or serious
misconduct.
The Governor is the BNBís chief executive officer, responsible for or-
ganizing, directing and supervising the activities of the Bank, and repre-
senting it at home and abroad. The Governor is the chairman of the Man-
aging Board. Each Deputy Governor heads a major department estab-
lished when the BNB became a currency board.
The three major departments within the BNB are the Issue Depart-
ment, the Banking Department and the Banking Supervision Department.
The heart of the currency board is the Issue Department. Most financial
transactions affecting foreign currency holding, the exchange rate and the
money supply pass through the Issue Department.
The Banking Department was established to give policymakers flexibil-
ity in the event of financial crisis. The Banking Department has monetary
reserves that can be used in a crisis situation to help banks, but these funds
are not to be used as part of the normal operations of the BNB.
The third major division is the Banking Supervision Department. The
Banking Supervision Department is the regulator of commercial banks. As
outlined in the preceding section, these responsibilities were greatly ex-
panded when the currency board was established.
 3. What Is Special about a Currency Board?
A currency board is at bottom an arrangement that legislates a particu-
lar monetary rule: a rule that changes in the monetary base will be equal to
the countryís overall balance of payments surplus or deficit (Williamson,
1995, p. 1).
There are several important aspects to this definition of a currency









1 will conduct monetary policy. With a currency board policymakers have
no control over movements in the monetary base, an important tool for
controlling the money supply (see Section VI). The monetary base
changes automatically when there are balance of payments surpluses or
deficits so policymakers have no direct control over the money supply.
A currency board also fixes the exchange rate to a reserve currency.
When the Bulgarian currency board was established a decision was made
to fix the lev price to the Deutschemark (DEM). The price was set at 1
DEM = 1000 levs. When new levs replaced old levs during redomination,
the price became 1 DEM = 1 lev. In January 1999 the euro was adopted
and the exchange rate is now fixed to the euro at 1 e = 1.9558 levs.
The price is fixed because the BNB promises to buy or sell as many
levs as anyone wishes to exchange at the established exchange rate. When
the BNB buys or sells levs, the monetary base automatically adjusts (see
Section VI). In order to make good on the promise to buy levs with
DEMs, the BNB must have sufficient foreign currency reserves to meet
the demand for DEMs (euros). During the first three years of the currency
board, the BNB has easily met this criterion.
To further guarantee that the monetary base will change automatically
with balance of payment surpluses and deficits, a currency board does not
hold domestic assets. This means that it cannot loan to the government or
commercial banks. Since buying government securities is a way of loaning
money to the government, a currency board is also prohibited from hold-
ing government securities.
Traditional currency boards operate on automatic pilot. Their key re-
sponsibility is to keep the exchange rate fixed. If there is a crisis in the
banking system and people withdraw funds from the banks in mass (i. e.
there is a ërun on the banksí), there is nothing that a currency board can
do.
The Bulgarian currency board was created during a time of crisis. The
problems created by a financial crisis were very real. A decision was made
to move away from a traditional currency board and create a Banking De-
partment, which could act as a lender of last resort in a time of crisis. Since
there were sufficient foreign currency reserves to put aside for this pur-
pose, these reserves were placed in the Banking Department.58
To protect the integrity of the currency board, the Banking Depart-
ment is permitted to lend only under very restrictive conditions. BNBís
Regulation No. 6 states that BNB may extend loans in levs to commercial
banks only when a bank is illiquid and then only if the stability of the
banking system is at risk. Even then only solvent banks experiencing acute
58
 Most currency boards are not traditional currency boards. The structure is usually
adapted in some way to local conditions. For example, in Argentina the reserve currency













needs for liquidity that cannot be provided from other sources can receive
loans and the loans have to be collaterized with liquid assets and their re-
payment term shall not exceed three months.
Furthermore, the Banking Department can provide only limited help in
a time of crisis. Regulation No. 6 further restricts the amount of loans that
the BNB can provide to the amount of funds the Banking Department has
on deposit at the Issue Department (see Table 5.2 below).
To understand the difference between a currency board a standard
central bank, it is useful to compare the present structure of the BNB with
its previous organization. This can be done by analyzing the key elements
of the balance sheets of the BNB before and after the establishment of the
currency board.
3.1. The BNB before the Establishment of the Currency Board
Before the establishment of the currency board, the BNB was not di-
vided into departments, and there was only one balance sheet. Table 5.1
shows this BNB balance sheet at the end of 1994, about two and half years
before the establishment of the currency board. The key elements of this
balance sheet are written in bold and are discussed below.
Table 5.1




Bulgarian coins  342 Statutory fund 200
Foreign currency 109 Reserve and other funds 91,094
Participation in international
organizations 12,075 Currency in circulation 45,935
Foreign securities 50,391 Current and deposit accounts 86,361
Deposits and loans extended
to commercial banks 89,946 Other liabilities 17,734
Loans to the government 40,087
Government securities 14,767
Other assets 33,606
TOTAL ASSETS 241,324 TOTAL LIABILITIES 241,324
Source: BNB Annual Report, 1994.
Assets:
Holdings in foreign currency: These were cash holdings of foreign cur-
rency. When combined with holdings of foreign securities, these holdings
represented the foreign currency reserves of the BNB.
Holdings in foreign securities: The BNB held most of its foreign cur-









1 balances. The BNB accumulated foreign currency reserves when it sold
levs and purchased foreign currency on the foreign exchange market. An-
other important source of foreign currency reserves during this period was
loans from international organizations including the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This continues to be the case in
the currency board period.
During the period leading up to the establishment of the currency
board, Bulgaria had a floating exchange rate. When a country has a float-
ing exchange rate, the central bank does not buy or sell foreign currency.
However, it was recognized by policymakers that movements in the ex-
change rate could affect prices in Bulgaria and the competitiveness of Bul-
garian products in foreign markets. There were several periods during the
pre-currency board period when the BNB did buy and sell foreign cur-
rency. For example, during the sharp exchange rate movements in late
1993 and the spring of 1994, the BNB sold foreign currency in an attempt
to keep the lev from depreciating too dramatically. Later the BNB at-
tempted to smooth movements in the lev and prevent large fluctuations.59
These efforts failed when speculators began to sell levs in the spring of
1996. The BNB tried to buy levs, the BNB had to use its foreign currency
reserves to purchase the levs. Soon BNB reserves fell to such low levels
that the BNB could not buy sufficient levs to prevent the lev from depreci-
ating.
Loans to the government: When the government operates with a deficit,
expenditures exceed revenues. The government must borrow. The govern-
ment has operated with a budget deficit in almost every year since the
transition began. Before the establishment of the currency board, there
were two ways that the government could borrow. The first was to borrow
directly from the BNB. This entry in the 1994 balance sheet is the amount
of loans to the government at the end of 1994. This transaction is almost
equivalent to having the BNB print money for the government to use to
pay its expenses.
Government securities: The government can also borrow money by
issuing government securities. These securities were purchased by com-
mercial banks, the State Insurance Institute and the BNB. A very small
part was purchased by individuals. The BNBís holding of these securities
was recorded here in the BNB accounts.
When the government issued government securities and they were pur-
chased by the BNB, the end result was the same as having the government
borrow directly from the BNB. The BNB essentially printed money that
the government spent.
59
 Bulgaria was not unusual in this regard. In many other countries that officially have a
floating exchange rate the central bank, in fact, intervenes extensively in the foreign ex-
change market to manage the movements of the exchange rate. See Calvo and Reinhart












As mentioned above, an important difference between a typical central
banking arrangement and a currency board is that a currency board is not
allowed to make direct loans to the government or purchase government
securities. This prohibition is a significant constraint and makes it more
difficult for a currency board to print money. It means that the BNB has
more limited discretion in carrying out monetary policy.
Deposits and loans extended to commercial banks: The largest single
category of BNB assets in 1994 was deposits and loans to commercial
banks. Following the ZUNK bond recapitalization of the banks in 1994,
two large banks (Mineralbank and Economic Bank) found themselves in
great financial difficulty. The BNB extended them large loans to keep
them from failing. This is referred to as ërefinancing.í This increase in
loans to the banking system also caused the money supply to expand.
Under the currency board arrangement, the BNB is not permitted to
make loans to commercial banks under normal economic conditions. Thus
under present institutional arrangements the BNB is not be permitted to
make the type of loans that were being extended to banks in 1994.
Liabilities:
Only brief explanations will be given here of the liabilities on the 1994
balance sheet since corresponding entries exist on the currency board bal-
ance sheets.
Currency in circulation: This entry reflects the role of the BNB as the is-
suer of currency.
Current and deposit accounts: These accounts fall into two basic catego-
ries. As we will see these are broken into separate categories in the cur-
rency board balance sheet. First, the Ministry of Finance uses its account
at the BNB in the same way that an individual or enterprise would use a
commercial bank account. Secondly, commercial banks hold deposits at
the BNB. Two important types of commercial bank deposit accounts are
settlement accounts and reserve accounts. Settlement accounts are used by
the commercial banks to facilitate the transfer of funds between banks
when, for example, payments are made between enterprises, which have
accounts at different banks. Commercial banks also place funds in reserve
accounts to satisfy minimum reserve requirements.
Reserve and other funds: This entry in the balance sheet contains more
than one important component. The first component is the net worth of
the BNB. Like other banks the net worth of the BNB must be positive to
remain solvent. The second component is borrowings from the IMF.
Throughout the transition period support from the IMF has been impor-
tant in maintaining economic stability. Indeed, the failure to reach agree-









1 3.2. The BNB ‡fter the Establishment of the Currency Board
When the currency board was established in July 1997, separate bal-
ance sheets were created for the Issue Department and the Banking De-
partment. Because the functions of the BNB were divided between these
two departments, the entries in the 1994 balance sheet were divided be-
tween the two balance sheets. Since the Issue Department is so central to
the operation of the currency board, we analyze its balance sheet first.
Table 5.2
Balance Sheet of the Issue Department, 29 December 2000
(thousand BGN)
ASSETS LIABILITIES
Cash and nostro accounts
in foreign currency 1,944,085 Currency in circulation 2,504,693
Monetary gold 641,768 Bank deposits
and current accounts 515,938
Foreign securities 4,625,328 Government deposits
and accounts 2,608,609
Accrued interest receivable 61,973 Other depositorsí accounts 675,213
Accrued interest payable 4,949
Banking Department deposit 963,752
Total Assets 7,273,154 Total Liabilities 7,273,154
Source: BNB.
Table 5.2 is the complete balance sheet. We will focus only on the most
important elements (in bold) in the balance sheet.
Assets:
Perhaps what is most significant about the asset side of this balance
sheet is what is missing. Unlike the 1994 balance sheet there are no entries
for loans to the government or loans to commercial banks. Under the cur-
rency board arrangement, these are not permitted.
The other entries are similar to those found on the 1994 balance sheet.
Cash in foreign currency accounts and monetary gold are part of the foreign
reserves of the BNB. Foreign securities are holdings, which earn higher in-
terest for the foreign currency reserve so most foreign currency holdings
are placed there. As can be seen in the balance sheet, these three entries
make up almost all the assets of the BNB Issue Department.
While the currency board limits the discretion of the policymakers at
the BNB, the board does have important decisions to make regarding the
choice of foreign currency assets to hold. The 1997 Law on the Bulgarian
National Bank (LBNB) provides very explicit guidelines on how these as-
sets should be invested. The risks here are very similar to those of any in-













The Law on the BNB states that the BNB must place its foreign re-
serves in very safe foreign banks and bonds. The banks must be highly
rated by international credit rating agencies (Article 28). To protect the
BNB from exchange rate risk, the foreign reserves must be in currencies
that reflect the balance of foreign currency liabilities (Article 31, para. 3).
To minimize interest rate risks the majority of the reserves must be in-
vested in short-term instruments. It is important that the reserves be in-
vested in liquid assets so that the BNB can satisfy the demands of any citi-
zen to exchange levs for DEMs (or euros).
During the first six months of 2000, 84% ≠ 88% of foreign reserves
were in euros and 7% ≠ 11% in dollars. Dollar holdings are important to
protect against exchange rate risk because most of Bulgariaís foreign debt
is in dollars and the payments for servicing this debt come from the foreign
reserve accounts at the BNB. To minimize the interest rate risk, 60% or
more of the foreign reserves were in instruments with less than a year be-
fore maturity.
Liabilities:
On the liability side of this balance sheet we see some elements that
were on the 1994 balance sheet. For example, currency in circulation,
which measures the amount of coin and banknotes outstanding, appears
on both balance sheets. On this sheet bank deposits and current accounts
and government deposits and accounts appear as separate categories. In the
1994 balance sheet these were grouped together. This separation is useful
because it is now easier to see the level of commercial bank reserves at the
BNB. We will see in Section VI that these commercial bank reserves are
important in determining the size of the money supply.60
A new entry on this balance sheet is the Banking Department deposit.
This entry connects the activities of the Banking Department to the activi-
ties of the Issue Department. The Banking Department balance sheet is
below.
60
 Another large entry is Other depositors account. In October 2000 Bulbank was sold.
These ëOther depositorsí are almost all deposits of the Bank Consolidation Company














and other precious metals 89,498 Borrowings from IMF 2,778,646
Investments in securities 167,695 Liabilities to other
financial institutions 1,664,287
Loans and advances to banks,
net of provisions 17 Accrued interest payable 1,995
Receivables from Government 2,560,928 Other liabilities 6,798
Bulgariaís IMF quota and holdings
in other international financial
institutions 1,664,086 Total obligations 4,451,726
Accrued interest receivable 1 Capital 20,000
Equity investments in domestic entities 2,294 Reserves 940,374
Fixed assets 141,382 Retained profit 230,235
Other assets 52,682 Equity 1,190,609
Deposit with Issue Department 963,752
Total Assets 5,642,335 Total Liabilites 5,642,335
Source: BNB.
The entire operation of the BNB should be looked at as a combination
of these two sheets. (Indeed, the BNB also publishes a consolidated bal-
ance sheet as well as these separate balance sheets.) The Banking Depart-
ment balance sheet really has three parts. On the liability side of the bal-
ance sheet there are two parts: Total Obligations and Equity. Equity is the
net worth of the BNB. In the 1994 balance sheet this was included under
ëStatutory fundí and ëReserves and other funds.í
Because the BNB earns money on its foreign securities but pays no in-
terest on its banknotes or commercial bank reserve deposits, the BNB is
expected to be profitable. 25% of its profits are added each year to its re-
serves. The remaining 75% are returned to the government. In 2000 the
BNB added to its reserves and made a payment to the government of
BGN 178 million. These payments are a form of seignorage.
61
Under ëTotal Obligationsí there are two large liabilities: Borrowings
from the IMF and Liabilities to other financial institutions. ëBorrowings
from the IMFí are loans that Bulgaria has received from the IMF. As a
member of the IMF, Bulgaria has an IMF quota. ëLiabilities to other finan-
61
 Seignorage is earnings that the government receives from its monopoly to print
money. In an economy without inflation, the government earns seignorage because
people will demand more money when the economy expands. The government can print












cial institutionsí is borrowing against this quota and unpaid parts of this
quota. This entry will shrink as Bulgaria pays off this obligation. (This is
closely matched on the balance sheet by the entry on the asset side:
Bulgariaís IMF quota and holdings in other international financial institu-
tions.)
Under a currency board arrangement, inflows of foreign currency re-
serves normally cause the money supply to increase; outflows cause the
money supply to contract. In designing the currency board in Bulgaria,
care was taken to organize the accounts so that flows surrounding foreign
debt payments would have a minimal influence on the money supply.
To minimize the impact of these flows involving the foreign debt, two
entries also appear on the asset side of the Banking Department balance
sheet: Receivables from Government, and Deposits with the Issue Depart-
ment. Deposits with the Issue Department correspond to the entry on the
Issue Department balance sheet Banking Department deposit.
Suppose that Bulgaria receives an additional loan from the IMF of
BGN 100 million. Bulgaria now has more foreign currency reserves, and
its liabilities to the IMF are now greater. The accounting, however, is a
little more complex than this. At first there will be entries on both the Is-
sue Department and the Banking Department T-accounts. These are








Deposit with Issue Department +100 mln. Borrowing from the IMF +100 mln.
Note that with this transaction the foreign reserve position of the BNB
has increased, but this transaction has not affected either the amount of
Currency in circulation or the amount of Bank deposits and current ac-
counts. When these entries are not affected, the money supply will not
change.
62
Following this transaction, the Government then has 90 days to deter-
mine if it wants this money to be transferred to its account. If the funds are
62
 The sum of Currency in circulation and Bank deposits and current accounts is the
monetary base. Changes in the monetary base will affect the money supply. For a more









1 transferred to the Government, then the following changes will be made to




Banking Department deposit -100 mln.




Deposit with Issue Department -100 mln.
Receivables from Government +100 mln.
This new transaction does not affect money in circulation or commer-
cial bank reserves so there is still no effect on the money supply.
63
 It is im-
portant, however, that this money is passed to a Government account at
the BNB. If the money were passed to a Government account at a com-
mercial bank, then commercial bank reserves at the BNB would change
and so would the money supply.
64
3.3. Using the Banking Departmentís Reserves
We have seen that the Banking Department was established to provide
resources to commercial banks in the event there are severe problems in
the banking system. If such a situation were to arise, the Banking Depart-
ment can use its resources to make lev-denominated loans to solvent com-
mercial banks. These loans must be fully collateralized and must mature
within three months. The balance sheet entries for the Issue and Banking
Departments would be the following.
In this case ëBank deposits and current accountsí increase. This is part




Bank deposits and current accounts +100
Banking Department deposit -100
63
 Since this is effectively a loan from the BNB to the government and the BNB, under
the currency board arrangement is not allowed to make loans to the government a special
provision had to be written into the law specifically for these transactions.
















Loans to banks +100
Deposits at the Issue Department -100
This raises serious questions about how this will operate in a time of
crisis. If commercial banks get into difficulty and the BNB extends loans,
the money supply will increase. As long as these loans do not exceed the
reserves held at the Banking Department, the monetary base should still
be smaller than the level of foreign reserves at the BNB.
As long as foreign reserves are greater than the monetary base, the
BNB should be able to guarantee a fixed exchange rate. But if people be-
gin withdrawing money from the commercial banks to exchange levs for
DEMs (euros), the commercial banks will lose reserves and will have to
contract. This could cause further economic disruption.
Thus the Banking Department provides some security in that the BNB
will be able to provide loans in its capacity as a ëlender of last resort,í but
it should also be recognized that this is not a panacea for financial disrup-
tions. A better protection against financial panics is good bank regulation
and prudent lending practices so that financial disruptions do not occur.
4. The Independence of the Bulgarian National Bank and
Political Support for the Currency Board
The BNB is an important economic institution. Ever since the founding
of the Bulgarian National Bank in 1879, there has been controversy about
the appropriate nature and extent of the BNBís independence from the
government. A period of increased independence from government in the
1920ís, for example, was followed by increasing government control in the
1930ís (Avramov, 1999).
The relationship between the government and the BNB was a conten-
tious issue during the period immediately before the establishment of the
currency board. The issue was who should control monetary policy: an in-
dependent agency headed by an appointed official who in theory is pro-
tected by law from removal from office or the government selected by the
citizenry? Independence is sought by those who wish to preserve the abil-
ity of a central bank to make needed but unpopular decisions on policy
matters. Greater control by government is sought by those who value re-
sponsiveness to a governmental policy course.
While the law provided support for independence, independence is
also a matter of actual practice. Christov (1997) makes a strong case that










1 A currency board provides little discretion for monetary policy. The
key political issue, therefore, is not independence, but government support
for the currency board. Support for the currency board is, in effect, support
for the monetary policy that the currency board represents.
Good macroeconomic policy requires good coordination between
monetary and fiscal policy. The existence of a currency board and the
monetary policy it represents does not change this requirement. A cur-
rency board disciplines the government because it is no longer able to bor-
row from the central bank. This may make it more difficult for the govern-
ment to carry out expensive programs if it has difficulty borrowing from
the private sector.
The mechanisms for stabilization under a currency board work better if
wages and prices are flexible. In most economies there are institutional
constraints that prevent wages and prices from moving freely in response
to supply and demand shifts. For this reason there can be large swings in
output as the economy slowly stabilizes. It is important the government
recognize these problems and refrains from carrying out policies that fur-
ther constrain wage and price movements.
Fixed exchange rate systems are always subject to possible speculation
when people anticipate there will be a decision to change the exchange
rate or abandon the fixed exchange rate regime. Even if financial support
in the form of foreign currency reserves at the BNB is strong and the fixed
rate can be maintained, speculative attacks on the fixed exchange rate can
be very economically disruptive. It is, therefore, important that the govern-
ment expresses strong support for the currency board to minimize the
chances of these speculative attacks.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this section we have seen the BNB has the responsibility for issuing
currency, maintaining the stability of the lev, and managing the total sup-
ply of money and credit. While the BNB was successful in the early transi-
tion years in establishing the lev as the medium of exchange, it failed to
maintain stability and manage the supply of money and credit. The result
was a financial crisis in 1996 ≠ 1997.
The crisis created pressure for institutional changes. The currency
board came into being in July 1997. This was a major change. The cur-
rency board took discretion for monetary policy away from the Managing
Board of the BNB and substituted a strict monetary rule where the money
supply expands and contracts with changes in the balance of payments.
Since the creation of the currency board, the exchange rate has remained
fixed to the DEM (euro). The supply of money and credit has been more
controlled.
A question that remains is whether the currency board is sustainable.












government policies. In Section VIII these issues are discussed in more
detail in the context of advantages and disadvantages of a currency board.
VI. Defining the Money Supply
The functions of money in a market economy are to act as a medium of
exchange, a unit of account, and a store of value. Under central planning,
however, money did not necessarily function as either a medium of ex-
change or as a store of value. Rather there were two types of money in
Bulgaria. One type was used to pay wages and circulated among individu-
als. This money was used to purchase goods and services on the market.
The second type, in state enterprise bank accounts, was used to describe
the transactions, which took place among state enterprises. There were
constraints on converting the second type of money into the first type.
When the Bulgarian economy was ëmonetizedí the distinctions between
these two types of money disappeared. Now that the Bulgarian lev per-
forms the functions of money as they are understood in market economies,
Bulgaria faces the same issues of definition and measurement of money
that exist in market economies. Arriving at good definitions of the money
supply in Bulgaria is especially challenging, however, because financial in-
stitutions are constantly changing.
Different definitions of money are used depending on the purpose for
which they are employed. Utilization of the proper measure of money is par-
ticularly important in the analysis of macroeconomic issues, where using the
wrong measure can result in poor policy choices. Traditionally the most nar-
row definition of money is called M1 and successively broader definitions are
referred to as M2, M3 and so on. M1 refers to assets that function as a me-
dium of exchange. M2 includes all these assets as well as those, which are ex-
tremely liquid, that is, easily converted into alternative assets, which can be
used as medium of exchange. M3, M4 include progressively less liquid assets.
The determination of what to include in each of these definitions can
change over time depending on institutional arrangements and common prac-
tice. If mechanisms are established which enable economic agents to make
payment with certain assets then these assets could be included in M1. They
should be included in M1 if economic agents actually use them to make pay-
ments. For example, money market accounts in the United States pay interest
rates competitive with savings accounts. A limited number of checks can be
written on these accounts each month. Even though the funds in these ac-
counts can be used to make payments, individuals rarely do so. In other
words, individuals could treat these accounts as a medium of exchange but in
fact they do not. So the decision was made to include them in M2, not in M1.
In Bulgaria, the BNB reports three measures of the money supply:
M1, M2, and M3 (or broad money). The Bulgarian M1 corresponds to the









1 deposits and time and savings deposits, which together constitute ëquasi-
money.í Broad money is the sum of M2, money market instruments, im-
port and restricted deposits, and deposits in non-operating banks.
Currently the definitions of the money supply, M1, quasi-money, and
broad money are:
M1 = C + DD (lev) QM = FCD + S + T
M2 = M1 + QM BM = M2 + RMN
where C is cash not in banks, DD(lev) is demand deposits in lev, FCD
is foreign currency deposits,65  S is savings deposits and T is time deposits
of all maturity levels. RMN is restricted accounts, which include funds de-
posited for purposes such as the registration of business licenses, money
market instruments and deposits in non-operating banks.
We shall shortly discuss each of these components, but first it may be
useful to get an overall sense of the magnitude and movements of the dif-
ferent measures. Table 6.1 gives BNBís calculation of the money supply
from 1991 until 2000. The table shows that all elements of the money sup-
ply have grown rapidly over the 1990s. This growth is misleading because
prices have also been rising rapidly over this period. The first row in the
table shows the lev/dollar exchange rate (expressed in new lev). The ex-
change rate changes are an indication of the price level change that has
taken place during this period. As can be seen in this row, it took almost
100 times more lev to buy a dollar in 2000 than it did in 1991.
Table 6.1
Money Supply
(millions of new levs)
Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec.
1991  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Exchange rate BGN/USD 0.02181 0.02449 0.03271 0.06602 0.0707 0.48735 1.7765 1.6751 1.9469 2.1019
Broad money 112.02 158.57 234.07 418.01 583.66 1310.28 6018.59 6597.17 7351.11 9304.00
M2 108.43 154.98 229.92 409.11 571.31 1244.57 5538.77 6180.59 6914.02 8920.21
M1 26.89 37.83 48.30 75.13 107.89 236.63 2266.89 2755.60 2996.64 3640.28
Cash 11.87 18.27 25.15 38.50 61.62 126.46 1314.11 1742.03 1957.35 2372.38
Demand deposits 15.02 19.57 23.15 36.63 46.27 110.17 952.78 1013.57 1039.29 1267.90
Quasi-money 81.54 117.15 181.62 333.98 463.42 1007.94 3271.89 3424.99 3917.39 5279.93
Time deposits 25.87 59.41 109.97 164.95 255.57 326.15 796.15 776.38 924.78 962.70
Savings deposits 15.95 20.22 28.05 40.85 57.82 81.61 224.83 292.29 387.86 450.20
Foreign currency deposits 39.73 37.52 43.60 128.17 150.03 600.18 2250.91 2356.32 2604.73 3867.03
Money market+Import and Restricted
+Dep. Non-operating banks 3.59 3.59 4.15 8.90 12.36 65.66 479.81 416.58 437.09 383.80
Source:BNB.
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 Until October 1992 both lev and foreign currency deposits were included in the defi-
nition of M1.  In November foreign currency deposits were moved out of M1, but were












It is possible to get a better understanding of the movements in the
money supply if the nominal values of the money supply are deflated by
the Consumer Price Index. Figure 6.1 shows the movement of the various
money supply components deflated by the Consumer Price Index so that
the movement in real money can be seen. The graph shows all the ele-
ments of M2. Since the top line is the vertical sum of all the elements in
the graph, the movements of the top line in the graph shows movements in
M2.
Figure 6.1
Real Money Supply Components
(millions of levs)
Source: BNB.
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1  Figure 6.2
Ratio of M2 to GDP in Bulgaria
Source: BNB.
Real M2 fell over the entire period 1991 to 1997, but the fall was par-
ticularly dramatic during the financial crisis in 1996 and 1997. By the end
of 1997 real M2 was less than one-quarter its 1991 level. This was really a
startling change. Since money did not play as big a role in the economy
under central planning, the expectation has been that transition economies
would become increasingly monetized over time; not less. Since 1997 the
money supply has grown, but it is still less than one-third the level of 1991.
Another way of measuring the degree of monetization is to compare
the movements in M2 to changes in GDP. Figure 6.2 graphs the ratio of
M2 to GDP. The graph shows that the fall in the money supply was not
simply a reflection of the decline in GDP that occurred in the 1990s. The
money supply fell even faster than GDP.
What does this mean for the Bulgarian economy? One way of viewing
these changes is to compare money to GDP ratios across transition econo-
mies. Figure 6.3 shows the broad money to nominal GDP ratios across
several transition economies in 1998. The range is vast. The ratio of broad
money to GDP varies from 70.2 for the Czech Republic to 16.9 for Russia.
Bulgariaís ratio of 30.6 in 1998 is considerably lower than the ratio for
most of the more advanced transition economies (i.e. Poland, Hungary,
Slovak Republic and Slovenia). On the other hand, the ratio is much
higher than the ratio for slower transitioning economies like Russia and























since both Estonia and Lithuania have currency boards and had severe
banking crises.66 As the graph shows, Estonia has a somewhat higher ratio,
but Lithuania has a much lower ratio than Bulgaria.
Figure 6.3
Comparison of Broad Money to GDP Ratio
in Transition Economies
Source: EBRD Transition Report 1999.
It is difficult to conclude too much from these comparisons, especially
given the range of ratios among the other countries. It would appear that
Bulgariaís present ratio is approximately what should be expected at this
point in the transition. This suggests that the earlier M2/GDP ratios were
unusually high and reflected the lack of monetary control. If the economy
expands and confidence grows in the banking system, then this ratio
should move upwards.
1. Definition of M1: M1 = C + DD (lev)
Analysis of the various components of the money supply provides a re-
vealing picture of the financial changes taking place in the Bulgarian
66 
As might be expected countries that have had financial crises, in general, have lower
ratios of broad money to GDP. The decline in the ratio of money to GDP was particularly
large in Bulgaria, however. Tang, et. al. (2000) present a table (Table 1) showing the
movement of M2/GDP ratios for twelve countries that have had banking crises. With the
exception of Macedonia, the fall in the ratio was largest for Bulgaria. In part this was be-
cause the ratio was so high in Bulgaria before the crisis. The cost to the government of
bank restructuring was also highest in Bulgaria (26% of GDP).












1 economy. We begin with M1, which contains only the most liquid assets:
cash and demand deposits. Both of these assets can be used as a means of
payment. More sophisticated financial systems provide a variety of ways
that payments can be made. Reliance on cash as a medium of exchange is
an indication that many of these alternative systems are still undeveloped.
Reliance on cash is particularly strong in Bulgaria and has remained so
throughout the 1990s. The widespread use of cash is related to several fac-
tors: the mechanisms of payment, the evasion of taxes and general con-
cerns about the banking system following the financial crisis.
What does not show up in the data is cash held in foreign currencies.
Other form of money are easier to monitor. Commercial banks are re-
quired to file reports describing their deposit balances so these numbers
can be calculated. Cash in levs can be measured because these notes are
issued by the BNB. The holding of foreign currency outside of banks is
very difficult to measure, however. People and businesses can acquire for-
eign currency by exchanging levs in Bulgaria or bringing banknotes from
abroad. Because it is not possible to calculate foreign currency cash bal-
ances, they are not reported in official statistics.67
Economists know that these foreign currency balances are important,
however. When people become nervous about the potential depreciation
of the lev, they will buy dollars and DEMs. Sometimes they will leave this
money as foreign currency deposits in the banks, but if they concerned that
the banks may fail or they want to hide these balances away from govern-
ment authorities, they will hold them as cash in foreign currencies. This is
what happened in 1996 in the middle of the financial crisis. People with-
drew money from the banks and held this money as cash in foreign cur-
rency.68
The use of banking services for making payment is largely restricted to
firms. In part this is a carry over from the central planning period when
banks were used by state enterprises to manage their financial transac-
tions. Demand deposits are now being used by both state firms and private
firms (some of which are former state firms that have been privatized). A
factor which has contributed to the wider use of demand deposit accounts
by firms is the development of Bank Integrated System of Electronic
Transfers (BISERA). This clearing system is operated by the BNB. Before
the development of this system it could take a very long time before a pay-
67
 It might be noted that $100 bills are much more visible in Bulgaria than they are in
the United States.  The main reason for this is that cash is not used for most transactions
of any size in the United States.  Credit cards or checks are the preferred method of pay-
ment.
68 A recent study by BNB has estimated that the public holds cash balances of about
400 million in euro currencies.  A study by the U.S. Treasury Department (2000) esti-
mated that Bulgarians were holding about USD 1 billion in 1997 during the financial cri-
sis.  For comparison this is more than 40% of all bank deposits by nonfinancial institu-












ment was cleared through the banking system. BISERA operated well
even during the financial crisis when banks were failing. Recently further
improvements have been made to the system.
Demand deposits are not used extensively by individuals. An important
reason why individuals rely on cash rather than demand deposits is that it
is still difficult for individuals to make payments from their demand de-
posit accounts. Although settlement deposits, which are accounts held by
individuals, can be used directly for payment, their use is limited to the
payment of utility bills. For this reason most individuals keep their liquid
assets in time deposit accounts rather than demand deposit accounts. This
contrasts sharply with the United States and most West European coun-
tries where other forms of payment are widely used.
This may change in the future as new services are introduced. For ex-
ample, banks are trying to convince companies to pay salaries through
banks. Employees could then withdraw their money using debit cards at
ATM machines. If the payrolls are deposited in demand deposit accounts,
then the use of demand deposit accounts would increase.
2. Definition of Quasi-Money: QM = FCD + S + T
Quasi-money contains assets that are very liquid but are not normally
used directly for making payments.
Demand deposits in foreign currency: Until September 1992 approxi-
mately 60% of demand deposits at commercial banks were in foreign cur-
rency deposits.  Until November 1992 these accounts were included in M1.
They were moved to quasi-money because they were used to store value
and make payments for imported goods but could not be used in domestic
transactions. In 1999 the law was changed and foreign currency can now
be used in domestic transactions, but it is more difficult to use foreign cur-
rency because foreign currency transactions cannot be processed through
the BISERA system, and there are special reporting requirements for large
transactions in foreign currency. For this reason the use of foreign cur-
rency in domestic transactions is limited.
Until foreign currency is more widely used in domestic transactions, it
is logical that foreign currency deposits remain in the quasi-money cat-
egory. The reasoning behind the decision is similar to the example of
money market accounts in the United States given earlier. That is, since
these accounts are not in fact used very much for making domestic pay-
ments, they should not be included in M1.
Savings deposits: Although savings deposits (i. e. accounts) are reason-
ably liquid, they are included in the calculation of quasi-money rather than
M1 because they are not widely used for transactional purposes. These ac-
counts are held by households. At one time this was the only type of ac-
count available to individuals and only at the State Savings Bank. Now all









1 can now negotiate with the State Savings Bank (renamed DSK Bank) to
issue checks on these accounts. However, the usefulness of the checks is
constrained by the small number of payments that can be executed with
them, causing their inclusion in quasi-money rather than M1.
Time deposits: The remaining category, time deposits, consists of
deposits held at a bank for specified periods of one month to a year, with
penalties for early withdrawal of funds. These are similar to certificates of
deposit in the United States. Penalties differ among banks.
The interest rates on these accounts vary with interest rates in the
economy. While the rates tend to adjust with the central bank base rate,
normally there is no enforceable contractual agreement between the cus-
tomer and the bank as to exactly how the interest rates will be set over
time.69  The inability of consumers to get a clear contractual agreement re-
garding interest rate adjustments on these accounts is an indication that
the banks still enjoy a powerful position relative to their customers. In gen-
eral, interest rates on longer-term deposits are higher to encourage cus-
tomers to place their money in longer-term time deposits. While time de-
posits are not used directly for making payment, they are now being used
by individuals as a highly liquid asset, which can be easily converted into
cash for making payments.
3. Defining M2 and Broad Money
M2 is simply the sum of quasi-money and M1. Thus, M2 contains all
the assets that we have described so far. Broad money contains all these
assets and money market accounts, import and restricted deposits and de-
posits at non-operating banks.
Import and restricted deposits: Import and restricted deposits include
funds deposited for purposes such as the registration of business licenses
and money put aside for the purposes of capitalization of companies. De-
posits restricted by courts to secure legal claims would also fall into this
category.
Deposits at non-operating banks: A number of banks failed during the
financial crisis, but the liquidation of these banks took some time. Deposi-
tors in these banks received their deposits, but there were restrictions
placed on the accounts and depositors were not permitted to withdraw all
their funds immediately. In 1999 the methodology for accounting for these
deposits was changed, and these deposits were included with restricted de-
posits in M3 until the banks were fully liquidated.
Money market accounts: These accounts include instruments that are
supposed to be tradable on the money market. They include instruments
like certificates of deposits. At present only First Investment Bank issues
these certificates of deposits, so there is very little money in these accounts.
69
 Some banks include a statement that the interest rate is adjustable and dependent on












4. The Changing Structure of the Money Supply
Figure 6.1 shows the movements of the various components of M2 over
the 1990s. Not only have there been dramatic movements of the M2 aggre-
gate, there have also been shifting relationships between the various com-
ponents of M2. The changes in the relative size of the components of M2
reflect changes in how money is being used by different agents in the
economy.
As suggested earlier in this section, if the transition process proceeded
smoothly, banks would develop many new services, which would make the
process of completing transactions easier. This should reduce the need for
cash and increase the value of deposits. There have been some new ser-
vices, which have led to improvements in the payment system. For ex-
ample, the BISERA system for clearing transactions is a vast improvement
over earlier arrangements. Automatic Teller Machines did not exist in the
early 1990s. These machines make it easier for people to withdraw money
from their accounts.
There are several important developments in the components of M2 in
the 1990s. In the early period time deposits grew dramatically. The level of
these deposits collapsed in the financial crisis of 1996 and have never re-
ally recovered from this experience. A similar but less dramatic pattern is
observable with respect to savings deposits. All savings accounts and al-
most 73% of time deposits were held by individuals in 2000. The sharp
decline in time and savings deposits is, therefore, a household phenom-
enon.
A recent study by GfK Bulgaria (Pari, 9.3.2000) found that only 27% of
the Bulgarian households had bank accounts in 2000. By way of compari-
son 98% of Austrian, 85% of Slovak, 83% of Czech, 65% of Hungarian
and 62% of Polish households had bank accounts. The study also found
that 11% of Bulgarian households had time deposit accounts and 10% had
savings deposit accounts.
These figures illustrate how households lost faith in the banking system
during the financial crisis, and the banks have not offered sufficient incen-
tives for individuals to return. While lack of confidence in the banking sys-
tem is surely an important factor, low interest rates on time and savings
accounts are another. Indeed for much of the recent period real interest
rates on deposits accounts have been negative.70
Demand deposits and foreign currency deposits show a different pat-
tern. In 2000, 85% of demand deposits were held by either state or private
businesses. Along with other elements of the money supply foreign cur-
70
 With low inflation, the opportunity cost of holding cash has also declined dramati-
cally. When nominal interest rates are 25% ≠ 40%, the opportunity cost of holding cash is
very high even when real interest rates are negative, as they were during some periods in
the early 1990s. When nominal interest rates are 4% or 5%, the opportunity cost of hold-









1 rency deposits and demand deposits fell in 1996. While the levels of for-
eign currency deposits and demand deposits are still below pre-crisis lev-
els, the recovery is far better than the improvement in time and savings
deposits. Banks have done a better job in servicing business customers
than they have households. Total real business deposits have fallen only
21% whereas total household accounts have fallen 86% between 1995 and
2000.71  Many of these business accounts are transactions accounts and
probably reflect the growing confidence in the BISERA system.
The level of real lev cash holding has actually grown and is actually
15% higher now than it was at the end of 1995. This is quite astonishing
given the expectation that other means of payment would replace cash as
the financial system improved. The growth in cash holdings reflects two
economic forces. First, with the establishment of the currency board,
people are more confident that the lev will not be devalued. Since we do
not have data on foreign currency cash holdings, we cannot measure the
trends in these holdings directly. However, these figures on lev cash hold-
ings would suggest that people have moved some of their cash holdings
from foreign currency cash holdings to lev cash holdings. Secondly, confi-
dence in the banks is still low so people are holding levs, but have not put
this money into the banks. Cash remains the alternative to bank deposits.
While the banking system is much stronger than it was in the pre-crisis
period, these trends highlight some continuing difficulties in the financial
system. The loss of faith in the banking system is significant because the
banks are still the principal financial intermediary in Bulgaria. When
households withdraw funds from the banking system, it is more difficult to
direct household savings towards investment opportunities. Without inter-
mediation, funds for investment purposes are harder for firms to acquire,
and the economy then grows more slowly.
5. Conclusions
The money supply in Bulgaria has experienced dramatic swings in the
1990s. While economists expected that a transition economy would be-
come more monetized as time passed, the financial crisis of 1996/7 caused
the real money supply to fall significantly. By 2000 the banking system had
only partially recovered. The money supply in 2000 was still far smaller
than it was before the crisis. This is an indication that the banking system
has only partially recovered from the crisis. Further evidence that these
problems are continuing is the high dependency on cash in the economy in
spite of a growing array of new banking services.
71
 Households also hold foreign currency accounts. Balances in household foreign cur-
rency accounts have recovered much more than time and savings accounts. In 2000 the
level of household foreign currency balances had recovered to about 82% the 1995 level.
Because time and savings accounts have fallen so precipitously, household foreign cur-












The difficulties with restoring confidence in the banking system have
important economic implications. Banks are still the dominant financial
intermediaries in the Bulgarian economy. Until confidence is restored,
there will be less intermediation and future growth in the economy will be
slower.
 Until October 1992 both lev and foreign currency deposits were in-
cluded in the definition of M1. In November foreign currency deposits
were moved out of M1, but were still included in the calculation of quasi-
money.
VII. Money Supply Determination
The supply of money and credit in the economy is determined by an in-
teraction between commercial banks and the BNB. In this section we de-
scribe this interaction and develop a formula which describes how the
money supply is determined in Bulgaria. We begin with a description of
the transaction settlement system that is now being used in Bulgaria. This
is followed by a discussion of the relationship between the BNB and the
commercial banks as defined by the law on commercial banking. Then, a
modified version of the standard money supply formula is derived. The fi-
nal section shows how the money supply will change under the currency
board arrangement.
1. Transaction Settlement System
Before the movement towards a market economy, there was no need to
quickly clear transactions through the banking system. The banks per-
formed the accounting procedures used by the central planning system, but
not the type of transaction service essential in a market system. It was not
uncommon for transactions to take several weeks to clear. To meet the
demands of the changed environment, the BNB created the BISERA elec-
tronic gross settlement system which is designed to provide clearance of
lev transactions within the banking system within three days. BISERA
does not encompass transactions in foreign currency. If companies wish to
carry out transactions in foreign currency through banks, banks must use
their ënostro accounts.í These are accounts that banks have at other banks.
To understand how transactions are recorded through the BISERA
system we describe a series of examples. In each case the payer is Com-
pany X and the payee is the Company Y. What changes in each example
is where these two firms hold their accounts.
Payee and Payer at the Same Bank: The simplest situation arises
when the payee and the payer have accounts at the same bank. Suppose
that both Company X and the Company Y have accounts at Bank A.
Company X makes a payment to the Company Y of 1000 levs. Money













Company X BGN -1000
Company Y BGN +1000
The responsibility for transferring these funds from one account to the
other is totally the responsibility of Bank A. No other bank is involved in
this process.
Payee and Payer at Different Banks: When Company X and the Com-
pany Y have accounts at different banks, transaction clearance becomes
more complicated. The BISERA system is used and the banks utilize their
settlement accounts at the BNB to clear the transaction. Suppose instead
of banking at Bank A, the Company Y has an account at Bank B.72
Since Company X still has an account at Bank A, the payment will still
have to be made from this account. The transaction begins when Company
X gives Bank A an instruction to make payment to the Company Y. Under
the BISERA system the account of Company X is reduced by 1,000 levs
and the Bank A account at the BNB is reduced by 1,000 levs. These entries
should be made at the end of the first day or Bank A will be penalized.
BANK A
Assets Liabilities
Dep. at BNB BGN -1000 Company X BGN -1000
On the second day it is BNBís responsibility to make the next two en-
tries. First, on its own balance sheet it records the corresponding entry to
Bank Aís entry showing that Bank Aís account at the BNB has been re-
duced by 1,000 levs. Since the Company Y has an account at Bank B, the
levs are transferred to Bank B.
BNB
Assets Liabilities
Bank A BGN -1000
Bank B BGN +1000
Bank B now records the increase in its account at the BNB and credits
the account of the Company Y.
72
 There are several methods of clearing transactions under the BISERA system. We















Dep. at BNB BGN +1000 Company Y BGN + 1000
The money has now been transferred from Company X to the Com-
pany Y. Under the BISERA system each stage takes no more than one
day so the whole process should take no more than three days. This was a
great improvement over the previous system, where the process of clearing
a transaction could be very lengthy.73
2. A Money Supply Formula for Bulgaria
The money supply in Bulgaria is determined by the interaction of the
commercial banks and the BNB. The process is essentially the same as any
country that uses a reserve system. Once a commercial bank acquires re-
serves, the bank can loan this money to nonfinancial borrowers and create
additional deposits at the bank. This adds to the money supply. A descrip-
tion of how additional bank reserves will cause the money supply to grow
can be found in any standard money and banking textbook.
A special feature of the Bulgarian system is that, under a currency
board, the money supply is determined by foreign exchange transactions
and the decisions of commercial banks. The purpose here is to describe
the special features of the Bulgarian banking system and show how these
features alter the way in which the money supply is determined. First, a
formula for the money supply is presented. Then this formula is used to
analyze how the money supply changes.
Over time there have been improvements in the way that the money
supply has been controlled in Bulgaria. At the beginning of the transition,
credit ceilings were used to control the money supply. Credit ceilings were
abandoned in July 1994.74 Under later arrangements there were tensions
between the BNB and the commercial banks regarding foreign deposits.
Because of concerns over money supply control, the BNB limited the use
of foreign currency as reserves. This created problems for the commercial
banks that had foreign currency deposit liabilities. If the commercial banks
had assets in levs to satisfy the reserve requirements, they had exchange
rate risk.75 Under present regulations commercial banks are allowed to
keep their reserves in foreign currency in the same ratio as their foreign
currency liabilities. So if half a bankís deposits are foreign currency depos-
its, the bank can keep up to half its reserves in foreign currency.
73
 It might be noted that this procedure is the opposite of the check clearing system used
in the United States. In the United States the first entries are made at the bank receiving
payment since the check is deposited by the payee.
74 See the first edition for an analysis of the effectiveness of credit ceilings. It was ar-
gued there that credit ceilings were inadequate for controlling the money supply.









1 The issue of exchange rate risk for the commercial banks has also
changed. Because the currency board fixes the exchange rate between the
euro and the lev, there is no fluctuation between the lev and the currencies
in Euroland. Thus there is no currency risk as long as the currency board
is maintained, and the exchange rate remains fixed. On the other hand,
holding US dollars or other non-Euroland currencies does create potential
exchange rate risk. For example, if the value of US dollar deposit liabilities
rise because the dollar strengthens relative to the euro (as it did during
2000), a commercial bank has to increase (the lev value of) its reserves. If
the commercial bank is holding dollar reserves, it will not have to increase
its actual reserves since the value of its reserves will also rise. However, if
a bank holds its reserves in levs, then reserves must be increased to meet
the minimum reserve requirement.76
Given the present treatment of foreign currency deposits and reserves,
there is no reason to distinguish between deposits in lev and deposits in
foreign currency when deriving a money supply formula. The reserve re-
quirement ratio used to determine the reserves that must be held against
lev and foreign currency deposits is the same. Foreign currency can be de-
posited at the BNB to satisfy the minimum reserve requirement. The only
distinction between the use of foreign currency and levs is that commercial
banks cannot use foreign currency cash in the vault when determining
their reserve position.77  Commercial banks can include a percentage, pres-
ently 60%, of their cash position in levs when calculating their reserves.
In constructing a money supply formula, we derive a formula for 2M .
Let DED  be the sum of all demand deposits, savings deposits, and time
deposits in lev, and all deposits in euros. If foreign currency deposits in US
dollar terms are FD , then the total money supply will be:
 DCDDCM p
FDE
p +=++= ε2 (1)
where pC  is the amount of cash in the hands of the public,ε   is the US
dollar exchange rate and D is all deposits at commercial banks. Consis-
tent with the definition of 2M  used by the BNB, cash holding does not
include foreign currency held by Bulgarian citizens.
In the standard construction of the money supply formula, movements
in the money supply occur when there are changes in the monetary base
MB .
78  The monetary base is the sum of two liabilities of the central
76
 See the section Changes in exchange rates later in the text for a more detailed expla-
nation of these changes.
77 Even though commercial banks cannot use foreign cash to satisfy the minimum reserve
requirement, they will need to hold some foreign currency cash to satisfy potential requests
for foreign currency withdrawals by customers. Any cash holding by commercial banks will
constrain money supply expansion because it will leave less money available to lend.
78 When a central bank has discretionary control over the money supply, the central












bank: cash C and commercial bank deposits at the central bank CD . The
central bank controls the monetary base and the commercial banks deter-
mine whether they wish to hold cash or deposits at the central bank. In
other words, the commercial banks are free to deposit or withdraw cash
from the central bank at any time. From the definition of the monetary
base we have:
 CDCMB += (2)
All cash (in lev) issued by the BNB will also be cash in the hands of the
public pC  or be vault cash vC  held by commercial banks. So
vp CCC += (3)
Let r represent the percentage of demand, savings, time and foreign
currency deposits that banks are required to keep in their reserve accounts
at the BNB. Then the relationship between required reserves, RR , and
total deposits, D , will be:
rDRR = (4)
There are two assets that banks can use to satisfy this requirement.
First, there are reserve deposits at the BNB, CD . Secondly, there is vault
cash. Only part of vault cash can be counted towards meeting the mini-
mum reserve requirement. Let vk  be the percentage of vault cash, vC ,
that banks are allowed to use to satisfy the reserve requirement.
Then vvCk  will be the share of vault cash included as required reserves.
Also let fk  be the percentage of foreign vault cash fC  that banks are al-
lowed to use to satisfy the reserve requirements.79 Then ff Ck  will be the
share of banksí foreign cash holdings included as required reserves. Total
reserves of the banking system, R , will then be:
 cfv DCCR ++= (5)
Required reserves will be part of total reserves since not all of the vault
cash can be counted to meet the reserve requirements.
 cffvv DCkCkRR ++= (6)
Combining equations (4) and (6), we have
 ffvvc CkCkrDD −−= (7)
currency board the monetary base changes automatically when levs are bought and sold
on the foreign exchange market.
79 At the present moment a bankís foreign cash holdings cannot be used to satisfy re-
serves requirements. So in this case fk = 0. But we derive the formula in a more general









1 Substituting equations (3) and (7) into equation (2) we have:
 ffvvp CkCkCrDMB −−++= )1( (8)
Let vρ and fρ be the desired ratios of banksí vault cash holdings to
lev and foreign currency deposits respectively. They reflect the desire of
banks to serve their customersí cash needs. Then using the definition of





vvp DkDkCrDMB ερρ −−++= )1( (9)
If we factor D from the right side of equation (9), we obtain
 [ ]DdkdkcprMB ffvv ρρ −−−++= )1()1( (10)
where DCcp p /= and DDd F /ε= .
The cp ratio depends on economic agentsí behavior. It reflects the
publicís desire to hold cash in levs rather than deposits. At present cash is
the princip‡l method of payment for transaction conducted by individuals
in Bulgaria. The cp ratio depends in general on four factors: (1) ease of
withdrawal from the banks and usefulness of deposits in transactions, (2)
nominal interest rates on bank deposits, (3) the size of the shadow
economy, and (4) the preference for hoarding cash in the form of lev
rather than foreign currency.
80
 Cash pays no interest so people holding
cash are foregoing the interest payments they would otherwise receive on
their money. The deposit ratio d reflects the preferences of depositors for
lev versus holdings of foreign currency. These preferences may differ for
individuals and institutions.
The ratios vρ  and fρ  relate to bank behavior. Banks need to retain
cash in the vault to service the demands of their depositors for withdraw-
als. Since banks earn no interest on the cash in their vaults, they have the
incentive to keep these balances at low levels so they can loan out as much
money as they can at higher interest rates. The need to service depositors
withdrawals imposes limits on the minimum level of vault cash they will
hold.
Finally, the ratios vk  , fk and r are policy variables determined by the
BNB.
The level of total deposits, D , can be found by rewriting equation
(10):
 [ ]dkdkcprMBD ffvv ρρ −−−++= )1()1(/ (11)
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 The level of cash outstanding has risen dramatically since the introduction of the cur-
rency board. For an extensive study of the implication of the rise in cash holdings in lev












The total money supply can then be found by noting that equation (1)
can be adjusted
 DcpDDDCM p )1()/(2 +=+= (12)
so that the money supply formula is
 [ ]dkdkcprcpMBM ffvv ρρ −−−+++= )1()1(/)1(2 (13)
With some modifications, this formula is similar to the one used in the
United States. The basic differences are two. (1) Banks offer both lev and
foreign exchange deposits which is reflected in the deposit ratio and in the
foreign exchange vault cash. (2) Only part of the vault cash can be counted
to meet the required reserves. If there were not foreign exchange deposits
and all vault cash counted as required reserves then
1,0,0 === vf kkd and the formula becomes the standard money mul-
tiplier formula.
Equation (13) illustrates that as long as there are certain regularities in
these ratios, changes in the money supply will be a function of changes in
the monetary base. On the other hand, the BNB has no direct control over
the behavioral variables cp , d , vρ  and fρ , and so changes in these ra-
tios may also affect the money supply.
The above formula gives us the opportunity to trace the impact of
changes in different variables on the money multiplier and the money sup-
ply. Since vk  and fk  appear in the formula with minus signs larger values
will increase the money multiplier. When vk  and fk are larger, banks
need to keep fewer reserves with the BNB. Banks can then extend more
credit and the money supply will be larger. A smaller r will have the same
effect. If the public withdraws cash in lev from the banks (as occurred dur-
ing the financial crisis period) the money supply will decrease because
cp will rise reducing the money multiplier.81  When depositors change the
distribution of their deposits between levs and foreign currency this will
change the d ratio. If the k ís and ρ ís differ, then this could affect the
multiplier.
3. Changes in the Monetary Base
Analysis of the money supply formula shows that the money supply is
most directly affected by changes in the monetary base. Before the estab-
lishment of the currency board the BNB was, in theory, able to exercise
considerable control over the monetary base through changes in its refi-
nancing policies and its purchases and sales of foreign currency or of gov-
ernment securities. In fact the BNB was under heavy pressure to finance
81
 The negative relationship between the cash to total deposits ratio and the money









1 government deficit spending. When the BNB loaned money to the govern-
ment, this increased the monetary base.
During the financial crisis in 1996 ≠ 1997, the BNB also tried to sup-
port the banking system by providing loans to the banks. These loans also
increased the monetary base and in turn the money supply. This expansion
was offset by foreign currency trading by the BNB. When the BNB en-
tered the foreign currency market and tried to keep the lev from depreci-
ating, it had to buy levs, this decreased the monetary base.
Under the currency board arrangement the BNB cannot lend to the
government or the banks so the monetary base now increases or decreases
when levs are (i) exchanged for foreign currencies, (ii) the government
collects taxes or makes payments, or (iii) the value of foreign currency de-
posits at banks increase or decrease. We look at each in turn.
3.1. Foreign Currency Operations of the BNB
When the BNB fixes the exchange rate, it is promising to buy all the
levs that anyone wishes to sell at that price or, alternatively, promising to
sell all the levs anyone wishes to buy. When the BNB buys levs, it pays for
the levs in foreign currency. This reduces the amount of levs outstanding.
The monetary base declines, causing the money supply to decrease.
For example, if someone comes to the BNB and buys DEMs with lev
currency notes, this will be recorded on the BNBís T-account as:
BNB
Assets Liabilities
Foreign currency reserves    DEM - 1,000 Currency in circulation BGN  - 1,000
Since currency in circulation is part of the monetary base, the monetary
base falls by BGN 1,000. This fall in the monetary base will create a fur-
ther contraction of the money supply. The size of this decline in the money
supply can be calculated using the money supply formula. Conversely, for-
eign currency transactions can increase the money supply if people use
their foreign currency to buy levs.
3.2. Government Operations
When the currency board was established, a decision was made to
place the government accounts at the BNB (see the Issue Department bal-
ance sheet in Table 5.2.).
Thus, the BNB serves as the bank for the government and all financial
transactions for the government pass through this account at the BNB.
Money in this account is not part of the monetary base. When the govern-
ment interacts with the public, either currency in circulation or accounts at
commercial banks are affected.












Company X pays its taxes from this account. The T- account transactions
would be the following:
BANK A
Assets Liabilities
Deposits at BNB BGN - 10,000 Deposit of Company X BGN - 10,000
BNB (Issue Department)
Assets Liabilities
Deposits of Bank A BGN - 10,000
Government deposits BGN +10,000
Bank Aís deposits at the BNB are part of the monetary base. Since
these deposits have fallen by BGN 10,000, the monetary base has de-
creased by BGN 10,000. The money supply formula will determine how
much the money supply will then fall.82, 83
This points to two problems with a currency board. First, tax collec-
tions and government expenditures in the economy will cause the money
supply to rise and fall unless they happen to be timed in such a way as to
offset each other. A central bank with discretionary authority can offset
these changes caused by government activity by increasing or decreasing
bank reserves (perhaps through open market operations).84  A currency
board cannot do this because it cannot engage in discretionary activities
that will affect the size of the money supply.
Secondly, when the government deficits spends its expenditures exceed
its income. More money is being put into the economy than is being with-
drawn so the monetary base will expand and so will the money supply.
Fortunately, during the years following the establishment of the currency
board, government deficits have been very small and this has had very
little effect on the money supply.
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 When the Banking Department becomes a lender of last resort and loans money to a
bank, the monetary base increases in the same way. This is described in Section V, Tables
5.6a and 5.6b.
83 See Nenovsky and Hristov (1998, pp. 16 ≠ 18), Dobrev (1999, pp. 20 ≠ 21) and
Manchev (2001, VI.8.2) for a more detailed description of the impact of government ac-
tions on the money supply. Dobrev also discusses this issue in the context of holding do-
mestic and foreign assets as backing for government deposits.
84 Indeed, most of the open market operations in the US are various forms of repur-
chase agreements. These are temporary sales and purchases of government securities and










1 3.3. Change in Exchange Rates
Since foreign currency deposits of commercial banks at the BNB are
part of the monetary base, the lev valuation of these deposits will change
with changes in exchange rates even if there is no change in the actual
amount of foreign currency on deposit. Since the lev value of these depos-
its changes, the monetary base valued in levs will change. This will make it
possible for the lev value of the money supply to change.
To see this, letís focus on the foreign currency deposits that the Bank A
might have at the BNB. First, note that foreign currency deposits in euros
(or Euroland currencies) should not create problems since the exchange
rate is fixed between levs and euros. On the other hand, if the deposits are
in dollars, changes in the exchange rate can affect the position of the
banks. Letís assume that the deposits are in dollars. We will ignore the
other assets and liabilities of the Bank A and BNB. (Note these are bal-
ance sheets, not T-accounts.)
BANK A
Assets Liabilities
Deposits at BNB in dollars      BGN 100,000   Deposits in dollars BGN 1,000,000
All other assets            All other liabilities and net worth
Example 1: This example assumes that the reserve requirement ratio, r,
is 10%. Even though the deposits are in dollars they appear on the balance
sheets in levs since the balance sheet accounting is in lev. In this instance,
Bank  A is holding dollar balances at the BNB which match the dollar de-
posits that it has in customer accounts on the liability side of its balance
sheet.
Suppose that the dollar appreciates by 5% relative to the euro and the
lev. On the balance sheet of the Bank A, the lev valuation of both the cus-
tomer accounts and the deposits it has at the BNB will change:
BANK A
Assets Liabilities
Deposits at BNB in dollars      BGN 105,000 Deposits in dollars   BGN 1,050,000
All other assets              All other liabilities and net worth
In this instance, Bank Aís deposits at the BNB have increased by
BGN 5,000 levs and the money supply has increased by BGN 50,000 levs.
These changes occur automatically when the exchange rate changes, but
the process does not stop there. Other changes can be expected to occur to
keep behavioral ratios in balance. For instance, with a higher level of bank
deposits, the public will want to keep higher cash balances (so that cp is con-
stant.) The money supply formula calculates the eventual change in the












Example 2: Suppose the reserve requirement is still 10%, but Bank A
decides to keep half its reserves in dollars and half in levs.
BANK A
Assets Liabilities
Deposits at BNB in dollars    BGN 50,000 Deposits in dollars     BGN 1,000,000
Deposits at BNB in levs        BGN 50,000
All other assets             All other liabilities and net worth
 Suppose the dollar appreciates by 5%:
BANK A
Assets Liabilities
Deposits at BNB in dollars   BGN 52,500             Deposits in dollars     BGN 1,050,000
Deposits at BNB in levs BGN 50,000
All other assets             All other liabilities and net worth
With this change Bank A does not have sufficient reserves. It needs
BGN 5,000 in additional reserves, but the change in the dollar exchange
rate has increased its deposits at the BNB by only BGN 2,500. Bank A will
have to sell securities or take other actions to increase its deposit position
at the BNB. In the end the 5% increase in the value of the dollar will cause
the money supply to increase (the monetary base increased by
BGN 2,500), but the increase will be half the size of the increase in the
first example.
This example also illustrates that when banks hold their reserves (and
their assets) in currencies different from their liabilities, they will have ex-




In this section we have seen how the standard money supply formula
can be used to describe the relationship between the money supply and the
monetary base. Under the currency board arrangement, the BNB has a le-
gal obligation to buy and sell foreign currency under exchange rate fixed at
1 BGN = 1 DEM. When the BNB buys foreign currency, the monetary
base increases. Other changes that will cause the monetary base to in-
crease are purchases made by the government and appreciation of non-
euro currencies against the lev. When the monetary base increases, the
money supply increases.
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 While we have not shown it here, the BNB must also be conscious of exchange rate
risk. If commercial banks hold foreign currency deposits at the BNB, the BNB will want










VIII. The Currency Board Advantages
and Disadvantages86
When Bulgaria established a currency board in July 1997, it was fol-
lowing the lead of two other small transition economies: Estonia, 1992 and
Lithuania, 1994. Later, Bosnia-Herzegovina also established a currency
board.87 In many respects the Bulgarian currency board has been a great
success. From hyperinflationary levels in February 1997, inflation fell to
single-digit levels in 1998 and 1999. Even with a large increase in world oil
prices inflation was only 11.4% in 2000. A dramatic fall in nominal inter-
est rates made it possible for the government to reduce large government
deficits. The economy also began to grow, albeit more slowly than might
be hoped during a recovery period.
In part this success is due to the discipline that has been created
throughout the economy. Not only has the discretion of policymakers been
severely circumscribed, limitations on central bank lending to commercial
banks has greatly reduced bank lending to state enterprises. State enter-
prises have been forced to restructure. In addition, fiscal policy has been
more disciplined because the government cannot borrow from the BNB.
What distinguishes currency boards from other fixed-exchange-rate re-
gimes is the credibility of the exchange rate fix. Credibility depends on
both economic and political factors. To sustain confidence, a currency
board must have sufficient foreign currency reserves to honor the pledge
to exchange local currency for reserve currency. Politically, the govern-
ment must be prepared to maintain the fixed exchange rate when adverse
circumstances arise. To build confidence in the currency board and make
it difficult to change the exchange rate, the exchange rate was written into
the law establishing the Bulgarian currency board. Whether there is the
political will to sustain the board will not really be known, however, until
there is a real test. Thus far the Bulgarian currency board has not been
confronted with a real challenge, but growing current account imbalances
may create problems in the near future.
When considering the future, two issues are of special concern. The
first is Bulgariaís large foreign debt. Bulgaria has been able to service this
86
 This chapter draws heavily on Miller (2001).
87 See Bennett (1992) for a discussion of the Estonian currency board. Proposals have
also been put forward to establish a currency board in Russia (see Hanke, Jonung and
Schuler (1993)). Hanke also proposed a currency board for Bulgaria in 1991.
Since the Asian crisis and the success of the Argentine currency board, there has been
extensive debate about the viability of currency boards. For some earlier discussion of
currency boards see Liviatan (1993), Schwartz (1993) Williamson (1995). Schuler main-
tains a web site with references to papers about currency boards. It can be found at
www.dollarization.org. Some earlier discussions of the Bulgarian currency board include
Hanke (1997), Minnasian (1998), Yotzov, et. al. (1998), Nenovsky and Hristov (1998),












debt since the crisis ended in 1997, but the debt issue could become more
serious if current account deficits persist. The second concern is whether
the automatic adjustment mechanisms which maintain balance-of-pay-
ments (BOP) equilibrium under a currency board arrangement will create
so much economic pain that they will not be politically sustainable. With-
out political support the credibility of the currency board will be under-
mined and the currency board will not be sustainable.
To analyze these issues we begin by describing some of the special fea-
tures of the Bulgarian currency board and discuss some problems associ-
ated with Bulgariaís situation. Then we utilize a framework provided by
Williamson (1995). He presents a list of advantages and disadvantages of
currency boards. We analyze whether advantages Williamson identifies
with currency boards have indeed brought about the improvements in Bul-
garia that would be anticipated. Then we analyze whether the Williamson
list of disadvantages to currency boards foretells serious future problems
for the Bulgarian economy.
1. Special Features of the Bulgarian Currency Board
In Section V we presented a description of the basic organization of
the Bulgarian currency board. There we described the separation of the
Issue Department and the Banking Department.
The currency board was organized this way because this structure has
important advantages for a country that has an ongoing IMF program and
large foreign debt service obligations. With a currency board changes in
foreign reserves will normally affect the size of the money supply. With
this structure IMF tranches and payments of foreign debt obligations do
not affect the monetary base. This arrangement reduces the volatility of
the money supply that would otherwise be affected by large movements in
the BNBís holding of foreign currency reserves. We will not show here
how this will affect the balance sheet of the BNB since we have already
used this example in Section V (see Tables 5.4a ≠ 5.5b and the discussion
there). It is important to emphasize, however, that reducing volatility in
the money supply that otherwise would have resulted from these transac-
tions was an important reason why the currency board was structured the
way it was.
This arrangement has some additional consequences, however. Under
a currency board arrangement a BOP surplus or deficit should generate an
equivalent change in the monetary base. However, the Bulgarian currency
board is structured so that government transactions involving international
financial flows do not affect the monetary base.
To see this suppose that through the privatization of a major company
to a foreign purchaser, the government receives a payment of BGN 20 mil-











ASSETS                 LIABILITIES
Cash in foreign currency  BGN +20 million    Government deposits    BGN +20 million
Neither currency in circulation nor commercial bank deposits at the
BNB are affected. So while foreign currency reserves have increased, the
monetary base has not changed. In effect these international activities of
the government have been ëspontaneously sterilized.í 88
Another interesting aspect of the present structure of the currency board
is the impact that government expenditures has on the money supply. As we
saw in Section VII tax collections of BGN 10,000 will decrease the mon-
etary base by BGN 10,000. As the money multiplier formula shows, the
money supply will then decrease by a multiple of BGN 10,000. When nor-
mal government receipts and payments affect the size of the monetary base
in this way, there is substantial money supply volatility. To reduce this vola-
tility, Nenovsky and Hristov (1998) have argued that government deposits
should be held at a commercial bank instead of the currency board. There
are several tradeoffs to be considered here. Government deposits were origi-
nally placed at the currency board because the banking system was consid-
ered to be too weak (Enoch and Gulde, 1997). If deposits were placed at a
commercial bank, IMF tranches and debt service payments would create
more money supply volatility than the present arrangements. Another alter-
native would be for the government to keep deposits at both the currency
board and commercial banks. The deposits at the currency board could be
used for IMF tranches and debt service, and the deposits at commercial
banks could be used for normal government operations. A possible disad-
vantage of this arrangement is that the government could influence the size
of the monetary base by moving deposits from one account to another.89
From the viewpoint of a purist, none of these arrangements is ideal.90
Since the governmentís deposits and its international transactions are
large, government activities will influence the size of the monetary base.
Under ideal conditions, money supply adjustments under a currency board
system should reflect only imbalances in the balance of payments.
88
 The term ësterilizationí is normally used to describe a situation where a central bank
(not a currency board) engages in an expansionary policy action (i.e. buys government
bonds) to offset the contractionary effect of buying local currency in the foreign exchange
market. (These purchases are usually undertaken to support the value of the local cur-
rency.) Many economists believe that such sterilization efforts are futile. The situation
here is different since there is no discretionary policy action being taken. The effect is the
same, however, since there is no change in the monetary base.
89 For example, a decision of the government to move money from the BNB to UBB
would cause UBBís deposits at the BNB to rise, increasing the monetary base.
90 This is one of the reasons why Hanke refers to the Bulgarian system as a ëcurrency












2. Advantages of a Currency Board
In this section and the next we consider more general issues regarding
currency boards. First we analyze whether Bulgariaís currency board has
benefited from the advantages commonly associated with currency boards.
Then in the next section we investigate what economic problems may arise
in Bulgaria under a currency board system.
2.1. Convertibility
A key aspect of a currency board is its guarantee of currency convert-
ibility at a fixed exchange rate. To assure convertibility there must be ad-
equate reserves to cover any demands for foreign currency. For a currency
board where commercial banks hold their reserves at the currency board,
the central bank should have foreign currency holdings at least as large as
the monetary base. This will be adequate to guarantee the fixed exchange
rate but insufficient to prevent a banking crisis. Commercial banks them-
selves will not have sufficient foreign currency to guarantee the convert-
ibility. People will be forced to withdraw money from the banks and
present their demands for foreign currency at the currency board. The cur-
rency board will be able to honor these demands, but the withdrawals will
bring about a contraction of bank liabilities and the money supply as
banks are forced to call in their loans and sell other assets.91
In Bulgaria at the end of 2000 gross foreign currency holdings far ex-
ceeded the minimum requirements for coverage of the monetary base. The
Issue Department balance sheet (Table 5.2) shows that the BNB had for-
eign currency reserves of BGN 7.27 billion and the monetary base was
only BGN 3.02 billion. Foreign currency reserves at the BNB were almost
twice as large as M1. Indeed the ratio, broad money/foreign currency re-
serves, was only 1.3 (see Tables 5.2 and 6.1). Under these conditions there
should be no problem in honoring commitments to the exchange rate fix.
While there should be no immediate problems, the longer-term picture
is not so rosy. At the end of November 2000 Bulgariaís foreign debt was
more than USD 10 billion. Debt service payments have been in the range
of USD 1 billion a year. To put these figures in perspective, the
governmentís deposits (including other deposits) at the Issue Department
represent approximately one and half yearís service payments. The total
assets of the Issue Department are approximately the same as the debt ser-
vice obligations over the next three years.
The future strength of the currency board depends on the management
of these foreign debt service obligations. Thus far these obligations have
been managed, but assistance from International Financial Institutions
(IFIs) [i.e. the IMF, World Bank, European Union, etc.] has been crucial.
Support from IFIs is a shifting situation. The IMF may change the direc-
91 










1 tion of its programs, as some critics of the IMF have suggested. If the IMF
stops its long-term loan programs, this could have serious repercussions for
Bulgaria unless other IFIs expand their lending.92
Other potential sources of foreign currency reserves include foreign di-
rect and portfolio investment and floating a Eurobond. Attracting private
portfolio money or floating a Eurobond has been made more difficult by
the financial crises in emerging markets, especially the crisis in Russia. The
war in Kosovo has further highlighted problems in the region. On the
hand, improvements in the situation in Yugoslavia could bring more finan-
cial resources into the region.
The high inflation that preceded the establishment of the currency
board in Bulgaria created a situation where there were more than enough
initial foreign reserves, but without the support of IFIs, the foreign debt
problem could still threaten the viability of the board. Because of these
debt problems, dependence on the IFIs has grown. It is still too early to
determine whether the stability provided by the currency board will pro-
vide sufficient impetus to the private sector to reverse this trend, but it is
unlikely that these changes will occur quickly.
2.2. Macroeconomic Discipline
Advocates of currency boards argue that currency boards will tend to
instill macroeconomic discipline. Williamson (1995) views fiscal policy, in
particular, as a political problem that may or may not be solved by the es-
tablishment of a currency board.
Very weak commercial bank balance sheets and large government defi-
cits helped bring on the Bulgarian financial crisis in 1996 ≠ 1997. Proponents
of the currency board hoped that the establishment of the currency board
would signal a change of regime and greater economic discipline.
The currency board has indeed brought an end to these problems. The
high inflation during the crisis reduced the value of the lev-denominated
government debt. This, along with lower interest rates, lowered govern-
ment debt service obligations. From 1998 through 2000, the government
budget has been more or less in balance.
The situation in the banking sector has also improved dramatically.
The banks have reduced their exposure to the nonfinancial sector and the
capitalization of the banks rose to more than 35% in 2000 (against the
minimum requirement of 12% required under the Basle guidelines). Ini-
tially the banks did little additional lending to the nonenterprise sector and
expanded their cash holdings and their holdings of securities. After the
first two years of the currency board, banks began to expand their lending
to the nonfinancial sector and reduced their cash holdings. Still the banks
continue to lend very conservatively.
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 As accession talks proceed with the European Union relatively more assistance will













By bringing more discipline to banking and government budgetary
policy the currency board has enhanced macroeconomic stability. This is
certainly a major accomplishment. While the economy has not grown rap-
idly, it has been stabilized, and it is easier for economic decision makers to
make new business plans with longer horizons.
2.3. Confidence in the Monetary System and Promotion of Trade,
Investment and Growth
Another important aspect of a currency board is that it should create
confidence and promote trade and growth. A recent empirical study by
Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (1998) finds that countries that adopt currency
boards do have better inflation experiences, and this improved inflationary
environment does promote better growth. Indeed, they find that growth
rates in currency board countries are twice as high as in pegged or floating
exchange rate countries, a difference of about 1.8% a year.
When the currency board was adopted in July 1997, there were imme-
diate indicators of confidence in the exchange rate fix. Nominal interest
rates fell from more than 80% in May 1997 to single-digit annualized lev-
els once the board was in place. These changes are to be expected since
speculators will arbitrage between the DEM and the lev. The interest rate
premium on lev securities is a measure of the additional risk in the Bulgar-
ian market. The interest rate differential between three month DEM and
three month Bulgarian government bonds has been around 2% since the
beginning of 1998.
While the currency board has been able to stabilize the exchange rate,
it has not brought dramatically increased inflows of foreign capital. A
number of privatization deals have been completed but the deterioration
in the capital stock over the past decade has been so great that many firms
have very little value. Per capita foreign investment remains much lower
than most other Eastern European countries.
3. Disadvantages of a Currency Board
In this section we discuss four disadvantages of a currency board iden-
tified by Williamson (1995): (a) the transition problem which arises when
inflation leads to overvaluation of the real exchange rate; (b) the adjust-
ment problem caused by BOP disequilibrium; (c) the potential crisis prob-
lem in the banking system when there is no lender of last resort; and (d)
the political problem.93
93 
The other issues that Williamson discusses are: seigniorage, the start-up problem and
the management problem. Currency boards allow countries to collect seigniorage. If Bul-
garia adopted the euro, it would not be able to collect seigniorage. The start-up problem
is the problem of collecting sufficient foreign currency reserves before establishing the
currency board. The management problem is the inability of a country with a currency
board to manage its monetary policy. This last problem is discussed below when the ad-









1 3.1. Transition Problem
The transition problem is the problem of bringing inflation down
quickly enough after the establishment of the currency board. Fixing the
exchange rate should bring inflation down, but inflation can have a mo-
mentum that leads to an overvaluation of the real exchange rate. The gold
standard mechanism will eventually correct the BOP imbalance that re-
sults, but the adjustment can be long and painful.
In Bulgaria there was some inflationary momentum, but it was short-
lived. Following the very high inflation during the first half of the year, the
CPI rose only 16% during the second half of 1997 and only 1% in the
1998. In 1999 the inflation rate was 6.2%; in 2000 it was 11.4%. The
higher inflation in 2000 reflected the worldwide increase in oil prices. In
the first part of 2001, the inflation rate was much lower, rising less than 1%
during the first five months. This is relatively low inflation, but it is still
higher than the inflation rate in Germany.
To determine whether this inflation would cause an overvaluation of
the lev depends on where the nominal exchange rate fix was initially set.
The real value of the lev fluctuated dramatically during the period imme-
diately preceding the establishment of the currency board (see Fig. 8.1.).
This made it more difficult to determine an appropriate nominal rate.
While perhaps a little undervalued, the nominal exchange rate chosen se-
cured a real rate in the middle of the range during the 1990s.
Figure 8.1
Real Exchange Rate




















From the time the currency board system was implemented until the
end of 2000, the real value of the lev is little changed against the dollar.
This reflects two offsetting factors. Inflation in Bulgaria has been higher
than in the US, but the US dollar has appreciated significantly in nominal
terms against the euro. Because inflation in Germany has been very mod-
erate during this period, the real appreciation relative to the DEM has
been 27%.
There is considerable disagreement about the importance of this real
appreciation. Banerji and Gelos (2000) have looked carefully at this ques-
tion. They concluded that the real appreciation during the currency board
period has been îquite moderate compared∑ with other transition econo-
miesí (p. 12). They point out that this situation could change, however, if
productivity improvements do not continue. An important factor here is
that wages in Bulgaria measured in US dollars are among the lowest in the
region.
On the other hand, Dobrinsky (2000) is more concerned about the
competitiveness of Bulgarian exports and worries that lack of competitive-
ness could lead to further deterioration in the balance of payments.
At present the most serious problem is that the balance on the current
account has moved from surplus to deficit. So a transition problem has
arisen. The current account surplus in 1997 was USD 426 million. In 2000
for the January ≠ November period, the current account deficit was
USD 656.1 million.
The deterioration in the trade deficit is even more severe, moving from
a USD 380 million surplus in 1997 to a deficit of more than USD 1 billion
in the first eleven months of 2000. Some of the deterioration in 1999 and
2000 can be attributed to the war in Kosovo and the difficulties associated
with trade routes to Western Europe through Yugoslavia which have been
blocked since the war.
Most of this shift is occurring in the trade balance. Initially, most of the
change in the trade balance was due to a fall in exports, but exports recov-
ered dramatically in 2000 and this increase in exports offset the rise in im-
ports caused in part by the increasing price of oil. The increase in exports
is an encouraging sign. In the period since the establishment of the cur-
rency board, there has been a major realignment of export markets away
from the former Soviet Union towards the EU and more recently other
countries in the Balkan region.
Rising imports reflect increases in both investment and consumption
goods. Given the very low levels of investment in the early 1990s, new in-
vestment is important if the economy is to continue growing.
The current account problems in Bulgaria are not yet severe. Indeed,
the current account deficits in Bulgaria (4.6% of GDP in January ≠ No-
vember 2000) are considerably smaller than recently recorded current ac-









1 rangements were established earlier than Bulgaria. These countries still
have economic stability and their currency boards have survived. Bulgaria
has been hurt by the crisis in emerging markets, particularly the crisis in
Russia and the events in Yugoslavia. Progress in expanding export markets
in 2000 is an encouraging sign. Without this expansion in exports, the
higher price of imported oil would have caused the current account deficit
to be much worse.
3.2. Adjustment Problem
Unlike Hong Kong and Argentina which have had a currency board
for a longer period of time, the currency board in Bulgaria has not been
faced with a speculative attack. Hong Kong experienced a severe attack
during the Asian Crisis, and there was speculation against the Argentine
peso during the Mexican crisis of 1994.
 There have been external events that might have generated a specula-
tive attack against the lev, but there has been no attack. This suggests that
there is a perception that the currency board is strong. For example, there
was no speculation against the lev when the Russian crisis occurred in
1998 or when fighting started in Kosovo in 1999 or Macedonia in 2001.
Bulgaria has also had to manage the large increase in oil prices and the
appreciation of the dollar in 2000.
Events like the increase in oil prices, the appreciation of the dollar and
economic problems in Turkey have had negative effects on the Bulgarian
trade balance. Current account deficits have been growing, and these defi-
cits could cause a contraction in the economy. These are the kind of prob-
lem that Argentina has been experiencing since Brazil devalued its cur-
rency in 1998.
Under a currency board arrangement there are two automatic adjust-
ment mechanisms if current account deficits arise. First, if the current ac-
count deficits create BOP deficits the monetary base will contract, the
money supply will fall and aggregate demand will decline. Either a fall in
output or a decline in prices will improve the current account balance. The
greater the decline in prices, the smaller the decline in output needed to
bring about equilibrium. Second, if the current account deficits are offset
by flows in the financial account, expanded investment in the economy will
lead to greater export potential. Greater exports will then reduce future
current account deficits.
 Thus far the current account deficits are not creating a monetary con-
traction. In spite of current account deficits the monetary base has actually
increased during the period mid-1997 to end of 2000. On the other hand,
the decline in exports is reducing aggregate demand. This should slow the
growth of the economy. If the money supply contracted, this would reduce












Under a currency board arrangement there is little that can be done to
offset these contractionary pressures. In a more flexible policy environ-
ment expansionary, fiscal or monetary policy might slow the contraction. If
Bulgaria had a floating exchange rate, a depreciation of the real exchange
rate might spur exports. None of these options exist under a currency
board.
The impact of contractionary policies on prices can be very important.
If prices are more flexible in a downward direction, the contraction in out-
put should be less severe. Figure 8.2 shows the relationship between
monthly CPI adjustments in Germany and Bulgaria during Bulgariaís cur-
rency board period. The volatility of price adjustments in Bulgaria has
been much greater than in Germany. This suggests that Bulgarian prices
might indeed fall more during a contraction than a country like Germany.
This should ease the output effects of a contraction caused by the adjust-
ment process that will take place under a currency board arrangement.
Figure 8.2
Monthly CPI Inflation in Germany and Bulgaria
Sources:BNB, IMF:International Financial Statistics, Bundesbank.
Since there has not been a contraction in the money supply, improve-
ments in the current account depend on the second mechanism where in-
creases in foreign investment improve productivity. Higher investment lev-
els, more imports of investment goods and indications of enterprise re-
structuring suggest that improvements in productivity may be possible. Still
it is too early to determine whether these productivity improvements will




















1 3.3. Crisis Problem
What Williamson refers to as the crisis problem arises because there is
no ëlender of last resortí under a formal currency board. In Bulgaria the
Banking Department provides some protection during a crisis. A substan-
tial amount of money was put aside in the Banking Department when the
currency board was created and the amount has increased over time. In
December 2000 Banking Department deposits at the Issue Department
were 14% of all commercial bank deposits.
Another protection against banking crises is the presence of foreign
banks. Most countries with currency boards have been countries where
foreign banks were dominant. This was true, for example, of the first cur-
rency boards that were in British colonies. If banks have lines of credit in
foreign currency upon which to draw, the contraction will be less severe.
Foreign banks should be able to draw on their parent banking institutions
for resources in the reserve currency, especially if their parent is in the re-
serve currency country. For Bulgaria today any bank from Euroland would
serve this function. With the sale of Bulbank to the Italian bank
Unicredito, a substantial part of banking assets are in banks with foreign
ownership from the EU.94
It is difficult to judge what will happen during a financial crisis, but one
can interpret from portfolio behavior what economic agents perceive the
risks to be. Under a currency board the risk of currency devaluation is re-
duced, but the risk of bank failure is greater. In Figure 2 the cash-to-de-
posit ratio is plotted for period beginning in December 1990.95  As can be
seen from the figure, the cash-to-deposit ratio rose dramatically when the
currency board was established. This rise reflects the greater confidence in
the lev as people exchanged dollars for levs. But confidence in the banks is
still weak.
The behavior of banks has also been conservative since the establish-
ment of the currency board. During the first two years of the currency
board banks held more reserves than was required. Later they became
more aggressive and reduced their cash holdings and extended more loans.
In part this reflected changes in the procedures for determining compli-
ance with the minimum reserve requirements, but it may also reflect pres-
sures on bank profitability. It is difficult for banks to make profits if they
are holding large cash balances and low interest paying government secu-
rities.
94
 The DSK Bank (former State Savings Bank ) is now the largest bank without foreign
ownership interest. It was not formerly a commercial bank but is presently being prepared
for sale to foreign investors.













The last disadvantage that Williamson lists is the political problem.
The question he raises is whether the currency board will really impose
controls on the fiscal authority. He remains skeptical that this will neces-
sarily be the case.
Thus far the currency board in Bulgaria has created an environment
where the government has been able to control budget deficits. If there is
a political problem, it is the appearance, perhaps, that the currency board
is too strong. In political debate the government has used the currency
board to deflect demands on the budget. This has created an environment
where the greatest political threat to the currency board is not the fiscal
actions of the present government, but the political attacks on the currency
board.
Ganev and Wyzan (2000) argue that these attacks are coming from
elites that have, in the past, been able to extract money through their con-
trol of enterprises. This extraction is more difficult now that the currency
board is hardening these budget constraints. Previously this group has had
the support of the poor who feared that restructuring would result in job
loss. As restructuring is proceeding, unemployment is rising. Ganev and
Wyzan state that it remains to be seen whether this rich-poor coalition will
form again and politically threaten the currency board.
4. Conclusions
The currency board has brought needed discipline to the Bulgarian
economy. The money supply is no longer growing too rapidly. Govern-
ment budgets are now under control. Banksí lending is much more cau-
tious. The result is that inflation has come down dramatically, and the
economy is beginning to grow.
Having met these challenges, there are others that still lie ahead. Bul-
garia still has a very large foreign debt. The servicing of the debt is still a
problem, and there is a heavy reliance on the IFIs to provide support for
these payments. These problems have been made more difficult because
the current account is now in deficit.
The current account deficit may well create the most serious challenge
for the currency board. Herbert Stein96  has been quoted as saying that
when something cannot continue forever it will stop. The current account
deficits in Bulgaria cannot go on forever. The problem will have to be cor-
rected. The question is how.
The long-term solution is growth. It is still too early to determine
whether the increased stability brought on by the currency board and the
inflow of new foreign capital will be sufficient to increase productivity. If
96 
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1 productivity improves, Bulgarian goods will become more competitive,
and the current account will readjust. If productivity does not improve,
then the long-term viability of the board will be in question.
If the Argentine experience is an indicator of what lie ahead for Bul-
garia, the biggest challenges may come from unpredictable external
events. Argentina adopted a currency board in 1991. Since then there has
been the Mexican crisis in 1994 and the worldwide financial crisis in 1998.
The currency board survived the Mexican crisis, but the devaluation of the
Brazilian real in 1998 has caused a severe downturn in Argentina.
Bulgariaís major trading partner is the EU. The lev is fixed to the euro
so there will be no devaluation of the euro relative to the lev, but deterio-
rating economic conditions in Europe or in other trading partners could
hurt the Bulgarian economy. The economy has already been hurt by the
decline in exports to countries in the former Soviet Union as economic
conditions in these countries have deteriorated. A currency board arrange-
ment provides little policy flexibility to offset the damaging effects of these
economic forces.
The Bulgarian currency board passed its first big political test during
the election of 2001. All major political parties officially announced their
support for the currency board. These announcements were made at a
time when people were clearly unhappy with the slow growth rate of the
economy. If, however, the current account deficits continue to increase or
there is a negative external shock and the economy contracts, there will be
additional pressure on the government to take action. The currency board
limits the options that the government has. If political uncertainty reduces
confidence that currency board arrangement will survive, the currency
board could lose credibility, increasing the risk of speculation against the
lev. It is, therefore, crucial that strong political support for the currency
board be maintained.
IX. Conclusion
Before concluding our analysis of the financial system in Bulgaria, we
would be remiss if we did not address the impact that European accession
efforts have had on the financial sector in Bulgaria. In this final section, we
first analyze these issues and then assess the overall situation of the finan-
cial sector using Stiglitzís financial sector criteria that we outlined in the
introductory section.
1. European Accession
As in many areas of the Bulgarian economy, developments in the fi-
nancial sector have been strongly influenced by the desire to meet the cri-
teria for accession into the European Union and eventual participation in












economic stability that has followed has made the prospects for accession
more realistic, although it remains many years off.
The explicit criteria for entry into the EU are very broad. They include:
a stable democracy, a functioning market economy, the capacity to cope
with competitive pressures within the EU and endorsing the economic,
monetary and political objectives as stipulated in the acquis that binds the
union together (Lavigne, 1998, p. 40).
Lavigne (1998) argues that more important than these explicit condi-
tions are the implicit conditions for EU membership. Among the most im-
portant implicit conditions is reasonable monetary stability that allows the
applicant country to participate in the single currency zone. While acces-
sion countries are not expected to adopt the euro immediately, it is a good
signal if they can participate in the present exchange rate mechanism
(ERM-II). This requires a country to fix its exchange rate to the euro
within a wide band of plus or minus 15%.
The European Central Bank has stated that a Currency Board is legally
compatible with ERM-II. A decision by ECOFIN (9.11.2000) confirms
this position. This means that there is no need to abandon the currency
board before joining the EU. Thus having a well-functioning currency
board should make it easier for Bulgaria to argue that the country is pre-
pared to meet the conditions for membership.
Joining the euro zone also provides an exit strategy from the currency
board. Critics of currency boards argue that they are inflexible and must
be abandoned at some point. The Bulgarian currency board need not last
forever. If reasonable stability can be maintained and inflation is reason-
ably low, the euro can eventually be adopted to replace the board.97
The prospect of eventual accession into the EU has been a catalyst for
legal changes and development of more sophisticated and well-functioning
institutional arrangements that meet the conditions of the acquis. New
laws and regulations for the financial sector have been structured to meet
these conditions. As Lavigne points out, this is only the first step for acces-
sion into the EU, however. îThe law must be applied and ≠ above all ≠ be
expected to be applied∑ (European Commission, 1995, Annex, p. 51). For
Bulgaria to satisfy this condition, the courts and the regulatory authorities
will have to demonstrate that these new laws and regulations can be ap-
plied in a reasonable manner, and the likelihood of another financial crisis
is very small.
Another condition for membership is competitiveness. To be economi-
cally competitive with the countries in the EU, Bulgaria will have to de-
velop a more sophisticated set of financial institutions. Banks will have to
97
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1 develop better lending practices, and nonbank financial institutions will
have to demonstrate that they can play a larger role in the economy.
The desire to join the EU has provided a strong motivation for reform
of the financial sector. The acquis has provided valuable guidance for how
this should be done. It will be years before a sound and well-functioning
financial sector is established and there will be bumps along the road
ahead, but there now exists a broad consensus on the direction of reform
in the financial sector.
2. The Stiglitz Criteria
While accession into the EU hopefully lies in the future, it is also valu-
able to assess what progress has been made to date in transforming the fi-
nancial sector. To appreciate the progress made in the development of
Bulgariaís financial system, it is important to remember the starting point.
Levs did not necessarily buy goods. Banking was monolithic and entirely
state-controlled. Secondary markets for financial instruments did not exist.
Since the transition to a market economy began, pressing macroeco-
nomic problems, from financial crises to the establishment of a currency
board, have dominated the attention of policy makers. Many of these
problems are now under better control. But the long-term growth of the
economy also depends on the development of sound financial institutions.
Here many weaknesses remain. At the beginning of this essay we cited
Stiglitzís (1992) list of functions that a financial system in a market
economy must perform. Now that we have described the Bulgarian bank-
ing system it is useful to return to this list in order to assess how much
progress has been made in each of the functional areas Stiglitz describes.
The difficulties at the microeconomic level become more evident as we
review this list.
1. Management of the medium of exchange.
Considerable progress has been made in management of the medium
of exchange. The lev has been established as a viable internal currency
used as a means of payment. The BISERA transaction payment system
now provides for more reliable transfers of funds among banks. The fixed
exchange rate established under the currency board has also facilitated in-
ternational transactions.
2 and 3. Transferring funds from savers to investors in new economic pro-
duction. Pooling small amounts of savings so that larger projects can be un-
dertaken.
 These two criteria are closely related since they both involve financial
intermediaries. The financial system is beginning to expand beyond the
core banking system, but almost all financial intermediation still involves
the banking system which is performing in a very conservative manner. By
selling the banks to foreign financial institutions which have more exper-












determine whether this strategy will work, but similar strategies have been
working well in Poland and Hungary.
At present there are few viable investment options in Bulgaria for the
individual saver beyond the banks. New laws and regulations have now
laid the groundwork for the development of other nonbank financial insti-
tutions. Regulatory agencies have been created. If these institutions per-
form reasonably well over time, confidence in these alternatives should
grow, giving savers more options and providing alternative vehicles for di-
recting savings into longer-term projects.
4 and 5. Choosing among projects so that the most productive projects re-
ceive the most support. Monitoring the use of funds so that they are used in
the intended way.
These two functions are closely tied. The difficulties that currently
hinder their effective performance are identical. Some economists have
referred to the early period of transition as the ënoisy periodí (Tirole,
1991). During this period it is difficult to evaluate risks because there is so
much uncertainty about the future course of the economy. Greater macro-
economic stability has lowered these risks from what they were in the early
1990s, but the rapid changes that are taking place as the economy restruc-
tures still creates an atmosphere where risks are high, although improving.
Added to this is the lack of expertise and experience of economic agents.
Unfortunately, the banks did not have the proper incentives to manage
their assets properly during the pre-crisis period so there are still many in-
experienced or untrained loan officers. Hopefully, the new foreign owners
will provide the needed management controls and training.
In the nonbank financial institutions, there is little experience since
these organizations are just opening their doors. The regulatory system is
far better than it was for the banks in the early 1990s so a future financial
crisis is less likely. But it will take time before these institutions function
effectively.
6 and 7. Enforcement of loan contracts so that the loans are repaid. Defi-
nition of how risks will be shared among borrowers and lenders when new
economic projects are undertaken.
Both of these criteria relate to the creation of laws that support business
activity. These laws are particularly important if a country is going to have
viable credit markets, because it is difficult to make loans if the lender does
not believe that the creditor will be forced by the law to repay the loan.
 Since the early 1990s, there have been significant improvements in the
law regarding bankruptcy and collateralization of loans. The process of
understanding the law and how it should be applied has begun. Significant
steps have been taken in setting up a pubic registry for recording collat-
eral. Bankers can now be more confident that they can recover their col-
lateral if a collateralized loan is not repaid. This was a significant problem









1 8. Lowering of risk by creating methods for diversification of invest-
ment risks.
There has been little diversification of risk in private sector investment.
The inability to obtain credit from the banks has forced most private enter-
prises to finance their activities out of their own savings. This has made it
difficult to start even medium-sized private production activities. It also
means that there has been almost no opportunity to diversify risks of pri-
vate market activity. As nonbank financial intermediaries grow, alterna-
tives to bank lending should develop.
For an economy to grow, effective mechanisms must be established to
channel savings to investment activities. Thus far these mechanisms are
still working inefficiently in Bulgaria. On the other hand, substantial
progress has been made in defining a legal and regulatory structure for the
financial system, creating an internal medium of exchange, and providing
monetary and exchange rate stability. Judged by the Stiglitz criteria it is
clear that there are still weaknesses in the functioning of the financial sys-
tem in Bulgaria, especially at the microeconomic level. Improving condi-
tions at the microeconomic level will take time and many problems re-
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